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On March 22, 1622, Native Americans under the Powhatan war-leader
Opechancanough launched surprise attacks on English settlements in Virginia. The
attacks wiped out between one-quarter and one-third of the colony’s European population
and hastened the collapse of the Virginia Company of London, a joint stock company to
which England’s King James I had granted the right to establish settlements in the New
World. Most significantly, the 1622 Powhatan attacks in Virginia marked a critical
turning point in Anglo-Indian relations.
Following the famous 1614 marriage of the Native American Pocahontas to
Virginia colonist John Rolfe and her conversion to Christianity, English colonists in
North America and English policymakers in Europe entertained considerable optimism
that other Native Americans could be persuaded to embrace both English culture and the
Christian faith. After Opechacanough’s surprise attacks, efforts to assimilate Native
Americans into the Virginia colony stopped. The attitude on the part of English colonists

in Virginia and policymakers in England became decidedly antagonistic toward Native
Americans, and English colonial authorities engaged in callous Indian policies in the
wake of the 1622 Uprising.
The inimical English attitudes toward Native Americans and the ruthless policies
of separation from and extermination of Native Americans spread beyond Virginia during
the seventeenth century and lasted throughout England’s colonial presence in North
America. Through primary source material including business records, journals, letters,
and broadsheets; as well as the work of eighteenth century historians and modern
historians and anthropologists, I intend to establish the lasting impact of the 1622
Uprising on Anglo-Indian relations.
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CHAPTER I
EARLY SETTLEMENT, EARLY CONFLICTS, AND THE PEACE
OF POCAHONTAS
Introduction: Why the 1622 Uprising Matters
Writers of modern U.S. historical surveys tend to mention the three AngloPowhatan Wars, seventeenth-century conflicts between English colonists in Virginia and
their Native American allies on one side and the Powhatan confederation of more than 30
Native American tribes on the other, only in passing when they mention them at all.1
Scholars writing specifically about the establishment and early development of the
Virginia colony generally discuss the wars as parts of a larger narrative. Each of the wars,
however, was an important event in its own right. The First Anglo-Powhatan War nearly
resulted in the failure of England’s colonial venture in the Chesapeake Bay region, the

John W. Caughey, John Hope Franklin, and Ernest R. May, Land of the Free: A History of the United
States, (New York: Benzinger, Inc., 1966), 56-57, 121; Robert A. Divine, et. al., The American Story, Third
Edition, (New York, San Francisco, Boston, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore, Madrid, Mexico
City, Munich, Paris, Cape Town, Hong Kong, Montreal: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 35-36, 39; Paul
Johnson, A History of the American People, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), 26; William J.
Rorabaugh, Donald T. Critchlow, and Paula Baker, America’s Promise: A Concise History of the United
States, (Lanham, UK, Boulder, CO, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2004), 23-25. Caughey, Franklin, and May, in their effort to write a multiracial history of the United States,
devoted a section to “Fighting Between Whites and Indians,” in addition to their brief mention of the
Anglo-Powhatan Wars in their summary of the Virginia Colony’s development. Divine, et. al, discuss the
Virginia Colony primarily as a business venture, and, touching briefly on the 1622 and 1644 Powhatan
attacks on English settlements in Virginia, represent them as efforts to drive the English from the region.
Rorabaugh, Critchlow, and Baker give the Anglo-Powhatan Wars short shrift, limiting their discussion of
the “starving time,” and the 1622 Uprising to one sentence each and neglecting the Third Anglo-Powhatan
War entirely. Johnson briefly discusses The Starving Time at the outset of the First Anglo-Powhatan War
and does not mention the second or third war at all.
1

1

second war altered Anglo-Indian relations, and the Third Anglo-Powhatan War resulted
in the breakup of the Powhatan confederacy.2
It is my contention that the Second Anglo-Powhatan War, which began with
Powhatan war leader Opechancanough's surprise attacks on English settlements in the
Virginia colony in March of 1622, had lasting consequences not only in England's
colonies in North America, but in England itself. Through analysis of primary source
documents including business records, letters, government papers, sermons, and diaries,
as well as secondary sources including the work of historians and anthropologists, I
intend to demonstrate the significance of this relatively obscure event. American historian
Alden T. Vaughan describes the 1622 Uprising as one of the most dramatic and
significant events in early American history, largely because of the policy changes that
the incident brought about. I intend to demonstrate that the Uprising was in important
turning point in relations between English colonists and Native Americans, and that
Opechancanough’s attacks on English settlements led to a hardening of English attitudes
toward Native Americans. Long after England was no longer a colonizing presence in
North America, Anglo-American politicians and military leaders would describe Native
2

Alfred A. Cave, Lethal Encounters: Englishmen and Indians in Colonial Virginia, (Lincoln, NE:
University of Nebraska Press, 2011),75-95, 117-133, 134-136; ; Frederic Gleach, Powhatan’s World and
Colonial Virginia: A Conflict of Cultures, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 128-134,
148-173, 174-199; James Horn, A Land as God Made It, (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 187-193, 268288; Helen C. Rountree, Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough, Three Indian Lives Changed by
Jamestown, (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2005), 111-128, 166-178, 182-187. In an
effort to present the founding of Jamestown and the development of Virginia from a Native American
perspective, Rountree devotes significant sections of Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough: Three
Indian Lives Changed by Jamestown, to discussion of the wars. Gleach, also writing largely from a Native
American perspective, chronicles Native American interaction with English settlers in Virginia from the
founding of the colony in 1606 to the outbreak of Bacon’s Rebellion in 1675. Horn limits his focus to
Virginia’s first 18 years, and therefore does not discuss the Third Anglo-Powhatan War, which began in
1644. Cave addresses the incompatibility of English political and social systems with Native American
customs and practices in his 2011 book, and. like Horn, devotes much of his discussion of Anglo-Powhatan
conflict to the first two Anglo-Powhatan wars.

2

Americans as treacherous. Popular perceptions of Native American untrustworthiness
would provide Anglo-Americans with an excuse to push Native Americans off lands they
craved for themselves as white settlement expanded relentlessly westward.3
I rely heavily on twentieth-century American historian and economist Susan Myra
Kingsbury’s edited collection The Records of the Virginia Company of London,
particularly focusing on Virginia Company secretary Edward Waterhouse’s 1622
pamphlet “A Declaration of the State of the Colonie and Affaires in Virginia, With a
Relation of the barbarous Massacre in the time of peace and League, treacherously
executed upon the English by the Infidels, 22 March last,” which reflected prevailing
English attitudes of anger and antagonism toward Native Americans in the aftermath of
Opechancanough’s surprise attacks. Waterhouse’s declaration is an especially important
primary source not only because it recommended a draconian strategy for dealing with
Native Americans that Anglo-Americans would follow long after England was no longer
an imperial presence in what is now the United States, but because its seems to be the
definitive account of the 1622 Uprising. Seventeenth century authors like John Smith and
Samuel Purchas relied on Waterhouse’s report for their own discussion of the Uprising in
their respective books The Generall Historie of Virginia, New England & The Summer
Isles, Together with the True Travels, Adventures and Observations, and a Sea Grammar,
and Haklutus Posthumus: or Purchas His Pilgrimes. A century later, the report was a key
element of discourse on the 1622 Uprising for eighteenth-century American historians
like Robert Beverley and William Stith. The document remains influential in modern

Vaughan, “’Expulsion of the Salvages:’ English Policy and the Virginia Massacre of 1622,” The William
and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, V. 35, No. 1 (Jan., 1978), 58.
3

3

scholarship. American historians James Horn and Alfred A. Cave, along with American
anthropologist Helen C. Rountree lean on it substantially in their own discussions of the
attack.4
The tendency of seventeenth-century Native Americans to rely on oral rather than
written traditions means that my primary sources present Anglo-Indian conflicts
predominantly from the English point of view. However, Beverley made an effort to
include Powhatan oral traditions in his history of Virginia, and Rountree and Gleach, as
anthropologists specializing in Native American studies, also provide some insight into
the Powhatan perspective.
According to Waterhouse’s report, 347 Virginia colonists were killed in the series
of surprise attacks that the Powhatan confederacy launched on English settlements and
plantations along the James River. However, Waterhouse’s figure was somewhat inflated,
because he listed approximately 20 women whom the Powhatans had captured during the
attacks and later released as having been killed. 5 The 1622 Uprising wiped out more than
a quarter of Virginia's European population, accelerated the collapse of the Virginia
Company of London, initiated an Anglo-Powhatan war that lasted for ten years, and

4

John Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, New England & The Summer Isles, Together with the True
Travels, Adventures and Observations, and a Sea Grammar, (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons,
1907), 280-291; Samuel Purchas, Haklutus Posthumus: or Purchas His Pilgrimes, V. 5, No. 19, (London,
New York, Toronto: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1906), 157-164; Robert Beverley, The History of Virginia, in
Four Parts, reprinted from the author's second revised edition, 1722, V.1, (Richmond, VA: J.W. Randolph,
1855), 39-41; William Stith, The History of the First Discovery and Settlement of Virginia: Being an Essay
towards the General History of this Colony, (Charlottesville, VA.: Reprint Company, 1747), 210-212;
Rountree, Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough, 169-170; Gleach, Powhatan’s World and Colonial
Virginia, 150-154; Cave, Lethal Encounters, 118-121; Horn, A Land As God Made It, 268-270, 276-278.
5
Edward Waterhouse, “A Declaration of the State of the Colonie and Affaires in Virginia, With a Relation of
the barbarous Massacre in the time of peace and League, treacherously executed upon the English by the
Infidels, 22 March last,” in The Records of the Virginia Company of London, Susan Myra Kingsbury ed.,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), V. 3, 565-571; Smith, The Generall Historie of
Virginia, New England & The Summer Isles, 300.
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generated shock and outrage in seventeenth-century England that would fuel English
policy changes toward Native Americans. Alden T. Vaughan wrote that prior to the
Uprising, English settlers in Virginia had begun to form an integrated society of eastern
Virginia’s Native Americans and Europeans within English settlements, and many
English spokesmen on both sides of the Atlantic favored peaceful and cooperative contact
with Native Americans. The policy changes from cooperation and conversion with Native
Americans to expulsion of Indians from the vicinity of English and extermination of
those who would not be expelled, which the 1622 Uprising brought about, were the
event’s most significant consequences because they would far outlast the Powhatan
confederacy and would extend far beyond Virginia’s borders.6
In the first chapter of this essay, I provide a brief overview of the early years of
English settlement in Virginia, touching briefly on the early outbreak of hostilities
between the Powhatans and the new European arrivals. I also examine the period from
the end of the First Anglo-Powhatan War in 1614 to the renewal of Anglo-Powhatan
hostilities in 1622. During this eight-year period, English policymakers for Virginia on
both sides of the Atlantic favored a program of peaceful coexistence, indoctrination in
European customs, and instruction in Christianity for the Powhatans.
In my second chapter, I discuss the optimism felt in England during the eight
years of peace between the English colonists in Virginia. A sermon preached by Patrick
Copland, a Virginia Company chaplain, will reflect the sense of buoyancy that prevailed

6

Vaughan, “’Expulsion of the Salvages’: English Policy and the Virginia Massacre of 1622,” 58.
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among Company investors. I will also examine the sense of astonishment and fury that
abounded in England when news arrived that the Powhatans had broken the peace a
month before Copland preached his sermon of thanksgiving. I then deal with the
1622 Uprising itself, and the immediate English reaction to the surprise attacks on
settlements on the James River.
Chapter Three addresses English policy and attitude changes regarding Native
Americans that came about as a result of the Uprising. The Virginia Company and the
Council in Virginia promptly abandoned efforts at coexistence with and the conversion to
Christianity of Native Americans as a result of the March 22, 1622 attacks, and pursued
instead a two-pronged program of partition from and wholesale slaughter of Indians in
the Chesapeake Bay region. I also look at the nature of English military action against the
Powhatan confederacy during the Second Anglo-Powhatan War, which clearly indicates
that English policymakers had completely abandoned any hope of harmonious relations
with the region’s Native Americans. I argue that, after Opechancanough’s attacks, the
Powhatan strategy of guerrilla raids on English interests suggested that the Uprising was
an attempt to confine the English in Virginia to a small area of settlement,
rather than to exterminate them or to make them abandon their colonization project.
Chapter Four covers the events that led King James I to order the investigation in
the Virginia Company’s management of the Virginia colony that ultimately led to the
revocation of the Company’s charter. The 1622 Uprising led to the failure of an economic
diversification project, in which the Virginia Company had invested heavily. Additionally,
the Company’s recruitment of new settlers for Virginia strained the war-torn colony’s
inadequate food resources, creating widespread famine and disease. Internal squabbling
6

in the Company, bankruptcy, and the king’s animosity would likely have brought about
the collapse of the Company in time, but the 1622 Uprising helped expedite that
downfall.
My final chapter deals with the long-term and far-reaching impact of the 1622
Uprising on Anglo-Indian relations. The two-pronged strategy of separation from and
extermination of Native Americans that English policymakers adopted in response to
Opechancanough’s attacks on English interests spread beyond Virginia’s borders in the
seventeenth century and lasted throughout England’s presence as a colonizing power in
North America.
A note on terms. I sometimes use the word Tassantassa, meaning Stranger, a term
that the Algonquian-speaking Powhatan confederacy applied to English settlers in
Virginia. I also apply the words mamanatowick, meaning “paramount chief,” or “great
king,” and weroance, meaning “king,” or “commander.” In general, I use Native
American terms sparingly, and primarily in an effort to reflect the Powhatan perspective.
Seventeenth century English writer William Strachey added a dictionary of
Powhatan terms to his 1612 book The Historie of Travail into Virginia Brittania.
Tassantassa appears to be a simplification of vtassantassowagh. The word
mamanatowick does not appear in Strachey’s supplemental dictionary, but he wrote in
The Historie of Travaile that Powhatan’s own people applied that designation to him and
that it meant “great king.” The Algonquian word for “king” appears in Strachey’s

7

supplemental dictionary as “wiroance,” but throughout his narrative, he wrote
“weroance,” when referring to district chiefs.7
An Inauspicious Beginning
Perhaps the foremost proponent of English colonization efforts in the sixteenth
century was clergyman and geographer Richard Hakluyt, who argued that staking a claim
to lands on the North American continent would provide convenient bases for fleets of
privateers to operate against treasure-laden vessels from Spanish colonies. By depriving
their Spanish rivals of treasure from the New World, English privateers would diminish
Spain’s power. The establishment of English colonies in North America would allow
Christian missionaries to distill “the swete and lively liquor of the gospel” in the minds of
Native American pagans. Furthermore, colonies in North America would alleviate a
growing overpopulation problem in England by allowing superfluous people to settle in
fertile and temperate lands “as yet unpossessed by any Christians.” Large numbers of
colonists could potentially produce goods like wine, oil, silk, fruit, sugar, and salt. In
addition, English settlements in America would foster profitable commerce with Indians.
Hakluyt’s arguments swayed Queen Elizabeth, who sponsored English efforts to establish
colonies at Baffin Island off the coast of present-day Canada, Newfoundland, and, most
famously, Roanoke Island in North Carolina’s Outer Banks. All three ventures were
unsuccessful, but a report from English soldier Ralph Lane that the mid-Atlantic region

William Strachey, The Historie of Travaile Into Virginia Britannia; Expressing the Cosmographie and
Comodities of the Country, Together With the Manners and Customes of the People, (London: The Hakluyt
Society, 1849), 79, 48, 190, 26-36.
7

8

could produce an abundance of wine, oil, flax, resin, pitch, and sugar elicited high hopes
for the region that English explorer and courtier Sir Walter Raleigh had named Virginia.8
The death of Queen Elizabeth in 1603 and the succession of King James I did not,
by any means, signal the demise of English colonial ventures. In April, 1606, James I
granted charters to the Virginia Company of Plymouth and the Virginia Company of
London, which divided the North American coast into two overlapping spheres of
influence. The Virginia Company of Plymouth, made up of merchants and financiers
from Bristol, Exeter, and smaller West Country ports, was granted the right to settle an
area stretching from the Chesapeake Bay to the coast of present-day Maine. The Virginia
Company of London, comprised of London merchants and investors, was granted the
right to found settlements between present-day North Carolina and New York, and it was
the London Company that sponsored the settlement of Jamestown. The colonists were to
pursue a policy of trading with Native Americans as soon as possible, but not to trust the
local Indians or to rely on them for subsistence. According to 1606 instructions from
King James I to the Virginia Company, conversion of Native Americans was to be
affected not through force and cruelty, but through fairness and generosity. Instructions
from the Virginia Company of London to the first group of prospective Virginia colonists
exhorted them not to offend Native Americans they encountered if such offense could be
avoided. On the other hand, the London Company seems to have acknowledged that
hostility between English settlers and Native Americans was a distinct possibility,

Richard Hakluyt, Leonard Woods, and Charles Deane, A Discourse Concerning Western Planting, Written
in the Year 1584, (Cambridge, UK: John Wilson and Son, 1877), 59, 10; Richard Hakluyt and John Winter
Jones, Divers Voyages Touching the Discovery of America and the Islands Adjacent, (London: The Hakluyt
Society, 1850), 9; Horn, A Land as God Made It, 37-41.
8

9

especially once the latter group realized that the newcomers had come to the Chesapeake
not merely to trade, but to colonize the region. Any demonstration of European firearms
in front of the region’s Native Americans was to be performed only by the most
experienced English marksmen, because inept shooting would cause Native Americans to
“think the Weapon not so terrible and thereby will be bould to Assaillt you.”9
In December, 1606, three ships, under the overall command of Captain
Christopher Newport and supplied with cargos of glass beads and copper to facilitate
trade with Native Americans, sailed from London on a trans-Atlantic voyage that would
end somewhere in the Chesapeake Bay region to establish an English colony there. In
addition to their cargos of trade goods, the Susan Constant, the Godspeed, and the
Discovery carried a total of 144 sailors and prospective settlers. Bickering among the
expedition’s leaders began long before the little fleet reached the Chesapeake. Captain
John Smith, the son of a yeoman farmer who had attained gentleman status through
distinguished military service, was too forthright in his advice to his highborn colleagues,
Edward Maria Wingfield and Bartholomew Gosnold, who accused him of attempting to
foment a mutiny. Smith arrived in Virginia in chains, and was freed only when orders

Horn, A Land as God Made It, 50; Cave, Lethal Encounters, 24-25; King James I, “Articles, instructions
and order made, sett down and established by Us the twentieth day of November in ye year of our raigne of
England, France and Ireland the fourth, and of Scotland the fortieth, for ye good order and Government of
the two several Colonies and Plantations to be made by our Loving Subjects, in the Country commonly
called Virginia and America, between 34 and 45 degrees from the equinoctial Line,” in The Jamestown
Voyages Under the First Charter, 1606-1609, V. 1, Philip L. Barbour ed., (Cambridge, U.K.: The Hakluyt
Society, 1969), 43; Council for Virginia, “Certain Orders and Directions Conceived and Set Down the tenth
Day of December in the Year of the Reign of our Soverain Lord King James of England France & Ireland
the fourth and of Scotland the fortieth by his majesties Counsel for Virginia for the better Government of
His Majesties Subjects both Captains Soldiers Marriners and Others that are now bound for that Coast to
Settle his Majesties first Colony in Virginia there to be by them Observed as Well in their passages thether
by Sea as after their arrival and Landing there.” in Barbour ed., The Jamestown Voyages, V. 1, 51-52.
9
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from the Virginia Company of London, which had been sealed until the ships arrived in
North America, named him one of seven members of the first Council in Virginia.10
Smith’s release and appointment to Virginia’s first governing body did not restore
amicable relations between himself and his fellow councilors, if such bonhomie between
the parties had ever existed. The aristocratic president of the Council, Thomas Maria
Wingfield, sneered openly at Smith, declaring that while the latter was a gentleman in
Virginia, any gentleman in England would scorn the thought of being Smith’s
companion. Smith despised Wingfield in turn, accusing him of hoarding communal food
stores for his own use. The other councilors apparently detested both parties, as well as
each other. One councilor, George Kendall, was executed for mutiny and Wingfield
himself was deposed and shipped back to England under arrest. John Smith was gravely
wounded in a powder explosion while he was on a trading expedition in 1609, and
returned to England. Smith himself asserted that his powder bag accidentally caught fire
while he was asleep, but also wrote that, upon his return to Jamestown, former Council
president John Ratcliffe and secretary to the Council in Virginia Gabriel Archer had
planned to have him murdered in his bed. Thinking better of the scheme, the conspirators
instead sent him back to England under guard where according to Ratcliffe, he would
answer charges of unspecified misdemeanors “whereof I persuade me he can scarcely
clear himself from great imputation of blame.”11

Horn, A Land as God Made It, 55-56.
Edward Maria Wingfield, ”A Discourse of Virginia,” in Jamestown Narratives: Eyewitness Accounts of
the Virginia Colony, the First Decade, Edward Wright Haile ed., (Champlain, VA., RoundHouse, 1998),
189; Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, New England & The Summer Isles, 91, 193-194; John
Ratcliffe, “Letter to Salisbury, 4 October 1609,” in Haile ed., Jamestown Narratives, 354.
10
11

11

After an initial attack on an English landing party at the mouth of Chesapeake
Bay, repelled when the attacking Native Americans “had spent their arrows and felt the
sharpness of our shot,” early relations between English settlers and the local Native
Americans appear to have been fairly convivial. Archer’s report on Captain Christopher
Newport’s 1607 exploration of the James River was full of references to Native American
hospitality and the eagerness of the tribes that Newport’s party encountered to trade food
for English copper and beads. Newport and his party appear to have attempted to
convince the tribes that they were in the region merely to trade, not to establish a
permanent settlement. 12
Construction of fortifications at Jamestown gave the region’s Native Americans a
clear indication, however, that the new European arrivals had not come merely to trade,
but to settle. A test of English strength came before Newport’s expedition returned. About
200 Paspaheghs, Quiyoughcahonnocks, Wayanocks, Appamattucks, and Chiskiacks
assaulted the fort, nearly overwhelming the English defenders until cannon fire from the
ships anchored in the James River repelled the attack. The tribes involved in the attack
were those whose land was closest to Jamestown, and were therefore most likely to have
concerns about new competition for the land’s resources. Although all of the tribes
involved in the attack were part of the Powhatan confederacy, they appear to have acted
independently. In the summer of 1607, after the fort at Jamestown was completed, the
Powhatan confederacy’s paramount chief, or mamanatowick, Wahunsenacawh, more

George Percy, “Observations gathered out of a discourse of the plantation of the southern colony in
Virginia by the English, 1606. Written by that honorable gentleman, Master George Percy,” in Haile ed.,
Jamestown Narratives, 90; Gabriel Archer, “A relation of the discovery of our River from James Fort into
the main, made by Captain Christofer Newport, and sincerely written and observed by a gentleman of the
colony,” in Haile ed., Jamestown Narratives, 103-114.
12

12

commonly known to modern historians as Powhatan for the town in which he was born,
made friendly overtures to the colonists and ordered the subject tribes in the vicinity to
cease their hostilities. Smith noted that the colonists of Jamestown, in spite of having
completed their fortifications, were in dire straits when the Powhatans made their offers
of peace to the settlement. Council member Batholomew Gosnold died of a famineinduced illness that also left fellow councilors John Ratcliffe and John Martin grievously
ill, and bickering among Jamestown’s leaders had led to Wingfield’s deposition as
president and Kendall’s removal from the Council and subsequent execution. The time
seems to have been ideal for Powhatan to mass his warriors to wipe out the squabbling,
starving colonists. Instead, the Powhatans supplied the surviving settlers with grain and
bread, just as autumn brought an abundance of edible migrating wildfowl to the region.13
Given the mutual antipathy among the Virginia colony’s leaders, it is not
surprising that whatever amity existed between English settlers and Powhatans did not
last long. The Powhatans’ penchant for seizing any tool that came within their reach as
payment for their hospitality rankled with the settlers, and the colonists’ incessant and
ever-increasing demands for food rankled with the Powhatans. Relations between the two
groups became increasingly strained, and by 1610 had degenerated into armed conflict.
Powhatan pursued a strategy of containing the settlers in their forts, killing any who
ventured out to forage or trade, and starving them into submission.14

Archer, “A relation of the discovery of our River from James Fort into the main,” in Haile, ed.,
Jamestown Narratives, 115; Rountree, Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough, 57-59; Smith, A True
Relation of Such Occurrences and Accidents of Note as Happened in Virginia, (Boston: Wiggin and Lunt,
1866), 13-14.
13

14

Rountree, Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough, 111-115.

13

The Starving Time and the Peace of Pocahontas
The colony narrowly survived the first Anglo-Powhatan War, which lasted from
1610 to 1614. At the outset of the war, starvation forced the colony's governor, Sir
Thomas Gates, to order an evacuation of Jamestown. John Smith, who had returned to
England in 1609 but plainly had kept abreast of affairs in Virginia long after his
departure, wrote that during the winter of 1609-1610, only 60 settlers survived out of
500. Smith, an exceptionally outspoken man both in his personal dealings and in his
writing, was characteristically graphic in his description of the desperate plight of the
settlers at Jamestown during the infamous Starving Time, writing that, after food stores
ran out, starving settlers resorted to digging up corpses and stewing them with salt and
herbs. In one incident that may have begun as a domestic dispute, one man allegedly
killed his wife, salted her corpse and gradually consumed it.15
Only chance saved the colony, as the fleet carrying the settlers down the James
River for the first leg of a voyage back to England encountered an inbound flotilla
carrying Gates' replacement, Thomas West, Lord de la Warre. The inbound ships were
laden with munitions, supplies, and 300 new settlers. Had de la Warre's ships encountered
a Spanish blockade outside of Chesapeake Bay, or broken up in a hurricane in the West
Indies, Gates may have completed his abandonment of Jamestown, drastically altering
the future of European settlement in North America.16
But no Spanish blockade or Caribbean storm prevented de la Warre from sailing
into the Chesapeake and ordering Gates back to Jamestown. The colony did not thrive in
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the next four years, but it had survived its closest call. In 1611, the Virginia Company
commissioned Sir Thomas Dale to establish a second English settlement at Henrico,
roughly 50 miles up the James River from Jamestown. English colonists were able to
trade with the Patawomecks, an outlying nation of the Powhatan confederacy. In April,
1613, Powhatan’s favorite daughter Amonute, visited friends in a Patawomeck town
ruled by the weroance, or commander, Iopassus. Amonute is celebrated in modern
American folklore by a pet-name that her father had given her: Pocahontas. English shipcaptain Samuel Argall was in Patawomeck territory on a trading expedition and, receiving
word of Pocahontas’ presence, concluded that a paramount chief's favorite daughter
would make a valuable hostage. Accordingly, Argall enlisted Iopassus in a plan to abduct
her. Iopassus persuaded Pocahontas to join him and one of his wives in a walk along the
riverfront. Seeing Argall's ship, Iopassus' wife professed an interest in touring the vessel.
Iopassus played his part by forbidding his wife to board the ship unless another woman
accompanied her. Pocahontas was conveniently the only woman available. The party
toured the ship, dined with Argall, and spent the night aboard. When the party prepared to
disembark the next morning, Argall had Pocahontas detained and declared her to be a
hostage for the return of eight Englishmen whom he claimed were prisoners of the
Powhatans, along with a cache of pilfered European weapons.17
The abduction of Pocahontas set Anglo-Powhatan peace negotiations in motion.
Powhatan's devotion to his daughter appears to have been genuine, because his response
to the news of her abduction was an immediate plea to Argall to treat her well. He
followed his entreaty with the return of seven English captives, along with the delivery of
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tools, guns, and a canoe filled with corn, plus a promise to deliver 500 bushels of corn in
compensation for any tools or weapons that were broken or missing. Virginia Company
secretary Ralph Hamor wrote that Gates, the colony's acting governor, would not believe
the remainder of the weapons that he claimed the Powhatans had stolen from English
settlements had been damaged or misplaced, and demanded their return. In the meantime,
Pocahontas remained a hostage at Jamestown.18
Sometime during her captivity, Pocahontas was moved to Henrico, where she met
tobacco planter John Rolfe and received instruction in Christianity from Reverend
Alexander Whitaker, the settlement's minister. Rolfe is known today not only for his 1614
marriage to Pocahontas, but for his efforts to introduce a profitable commodity to
Virginia’s economy. Arriving in Virginia with de la Warre’s expedition, he began planting
a strain of tobacco from seeds that he had brought from the West Indies. Sweeter and
more fragrant than the tobacco that was native to the Chesapeake Bay region, it was more
palatable to European smokers and quickly became Virginia’s first cash crop. Indeed,
Virginia’s dependence on tobacco as its sole profitable export eventually became a bone
of contention between the Virginia Company and King James I.19
When Powhatan did not reply to Gates' demand for the return of missing weapons
and tools, Dale forced the issue in March, 1614, nearly a year after Pocahontas’ capture.
Hamor described Dale's expedition up the Pamunkey (now the York) River, where
Powhatan's “chiefest habitations” lie. Pocahontas and 150 well-armed settlers
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accompanied the expedition, whose purpose was to force the Powhatans to either fight or
restore the remainder of the missing tools and weapons.20
At Matchcot, one of Powhatan's principle towns, Dale's party found themselves
facing some 400 Powhatans, armed with bows and arrows. The colonists went ashore
peacefully, but the tension on both sides must have been palpable as each party waited for
the other to make a hostile move. The arrival of two of Pocahontas’ brothers broke the
impasse as they pressed Dale to allow them to see their sister. When Powhatan arrived,
with his brother and successor Opitchapam, peace negotiations began in earnest. In a
1614 letter to a friend known only by the initials D.M., Dale wrote that Pocahontas, given
a choice between being restored to her father's people or remaining with her English
captors, expressed disgust at Powhatan's avarice, saying that if her father had truly prized
her, he would not have valued her less than old swords, muskets, and axes, and she would
therefore remain with the English, who loved her.21
In June, 1614, Whitaker reported in a letter to his cousin, a Master Gouge, that his
star Native American pupil had married “an honest and discreet English gentleman,
Master Rolfe,” and that furthermore, Pocahontas had openly rejected Powhatan religious
practices, had been baptized as a Christian, and had taken the name Rebecca. Judging
from his letter to Dale, the colony's newly-appointed governor, Rolfe seemed to have
found the chance to convert Pocahontas to European culture and beliefs more of a
motivating factor in his decision to marry her than any sort of romantic attachment. He
also appears to have been fending off criticism of his marriage of a Native American,

Hamor, A True Discourse of the Present State of Virginia, 7.
Hamor, A True Discourse of the Present State of Virginia, 10; Sir Thomas Dale, “To the Reverend and
Most Esteemed Mr. D.M., at His House at F. Ch. In London,” in Haile ed., Jamestown Narratives, 844.
20
21

17

insisting in his letter to Dale that he acted not out of carnal desire, as some of his English
critics claimed, but for the good of the colony, his own salvation, the glory of God, and
the conversion of an unbeliever.22
Pocahontas’ decision to remain among the English settlers was an indication that
she may have come to identify with her captors, having been abducted at the age of 16,
when she could have learned new languages and new customs and practices fairly readily.
Her confinement, the rigid schedule that her English custodians imposed, and their
continuous insistence that Native American practices were wrong amounted to an
immersion in European culture. Such an immersion at an impressionable age could well
have had a lasting psychological impact. Additionally, she would have found herself
farther removed from the paramount chief and the center of Powhatan power with each
new succession among her own people, while her English captors treated her as a person
of unique consequence.23
Whatever her reasons may have been for remaining among the English and
marrying an Englishman, there is no doubt that Pocahontas’ choice was a momentous
one. To the settlers in Virginia and policymakers in England, she may have embodied the
triumph of English beliefs and practices over a Native American culture they had always
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Powhatan truce, her conversion and marriage to Rolfe ended the First Anglo-Powhatan
War, ushering in an eight-year lull in Anglo-Powhatan hostilities that is commonly known
as The Peace of Pocahontas.25
Because of their success in Anglicizing one of Virginia's Indians, Englishmen on
both sides of the Atlantic Ocean held out hope that they could indoctrinate all of the
region's Native Americans into European culture, effectively training them to become
obedient subjects of the English crown. Indeed, the first clause of the treaty that officially
ended the First Anglo-Powhatan War specified that the Powhatans would consider
themselves subjects of King James I. Perhaps Dale decided that interracial marriage was
a key to training Native Americans in subservience to English culture and the English
crown, because in March, 1615, he attempted to emulate John Rolfe's example. He
dispatched Captain Ralph Hamor on a diplomatic mission to Powhatan at Matchcot in
hopes of arranging a marriage between himself and the mamanatowick's youngest
daughter.26
Powhatan seems to have received Hamor cordially, perhaps because Hamor's
party had come bringing gifts of copper, glass beads, fishhooks, combs, and knives.
Hamor appears to have been somewhat abrupt in his manner, coming to the point of his

culture inferior to their own. In “A Counterblaste to Tobacco,” James I reviled Native Americans as
“godless and slavish,” and as “aliens from the holy Covenant of God,” while denouncing their customs as
“barbarous and beastly.” In his 1608 account of his capture by Opechancanough, John Smith was
simultaneously appreciative and condescending of Powhatan’s reception of him at Werecomoco, writing
that “it drave me into admiration to see such state in a naked Salvage.” Strachey, while consistently
referring to Native Americans as “Indians,” rather than such pejoratives as “Salvages,” or “heathens,” was
unable to refrain from describing Powhatan as “such a barbarous and uncivill prince,” or censuring the
Powhatan acceptance of polygamy as “sensuall heathenism.”
25
National Park Service, “Pocahontas: Her Life and Legend,” Historic Jamestowne, accessed February 19,
2016, http://www.nps.gov/jame/learn/historyculture/pocahontas-her-life-and-legend.htm.
26
Hamor, A True Discourse of the Present State of Virginia, 42.

19

mission after sharing only a ceremonial pipe. In this case, Powhatan’s family feeling
appears to have overcome his covetousness, because he refused offers of “treble the price
of his daughter, in beades, Copper, Hatchets and many other things more useful for him,”
and sent Hamor back to Dale with the mild rebuke that “I holde it not a brotherly part of
your king, to desire to bereave me of two of my children at once.”27
In spite of Powhatan's rebuff of an English suitor for a second of his daughters,
Anglo-Powhatan relations remained cordial, and efforts to assimilate Native Americans
into an English colony continued. In their first meeting in 1619, members of the Virginia
General Assembly authorized local officials throughout the colony to obtain Native
American children through just means for education in “true religion and civile course of
life.” By 1621, the Virginia Company, with help from the Church of England, was
actively raising funds to open the College of Henricus, a boarding school for young
Native Americans, who would be removed from their tribes for the sort of immersion in
European culture that Pocahontas must have experienced. Additionally, the Assembly
resolved that small numbers of Powhatan adults could live and work in well-populated
English settlements under the provision that “good guarde in the night be kept upon
them.” The Assembly's general caution against complacency was an understandable one
in light of the Anglo-Powhatan hostilities of the very recent past. In a May, 1621 letter to
Sir Edwin Sandys, Thorpe, a member of the Council in Virginia, wrote that the
Powhatans had increasingly adopted English fashions, and requested that the Virginia
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Company send apparel and household goods for distribution to the Powhatans as gifts. In
a 1621 report compiled from various letters from Virginia colonists, Purchas related that
Opechancanough took particular pleasure in an English-style house that had been built
for him. He displayed it proudly to both hisown people and to strangers, Purchas wrote,
and seemed especially fascinated by the locks and the keys, “locking and unlocking the
doores, sometimes a hundred times in a day.”28 Purchas appears to have found
Opechancanough's constant manipulation of his locks and keys amusing as an indicator
of his supposed primitive nature.
While Purchas chuckled with Anglocentric condescension at Opechancanough's
simplicity, he could have interpreted the Powhatan war-chief's obsession as a
determination to master every piece of European technology at his disposal. And
Opechancanough could very well have been playing a role for the benefit of his English
observers: the wide-eyed primitive, spellbound by the workings of a seventeenth-century
security device. Later events overwhelmingly support the idea that the Powhatan warleader was actively attempting to foster the same sense of complacency against which the
colony's General Assembly had cautioned settlers, and his assumption of the role of an
untutored barbarian overcome with the wonders of European technology was almost
certainly part of that effort.

Virginia General Assembly, “The First Assembly of Virginia, held July 30, 1619,” Colonial Records of
Virginia, Mark C. Orton, Thomas Strong ed., (Richmond, VA: R.F. Walker, Superintendent Public Printing,
1874), 20-21; Janie Mae Jones McKinley,, The Cultural Roots of the 1622 Indian Attack: Richard Pace and
Chanco Save Jamestown, (Silva, NC: Catch the Spirit of Appalachia, Inc., 2011), 96; George Thorpe and
John Pory, “A Letter to Sir Edwin Sandys, May 15 and 16, 1621,” in Kingsbury ed., The Records of the
Virginia Company of London, V. 3, 446; Purchas, Haklutus Posthumus: or Purchas His Pilgrimes, 153.
28

21

Lulling the Tassantassas
Even as Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic hoped to transform purportedly
barbaric Native Americans into loyal and productive subjects of the King of England,
Powhatan aspired to incorporate the new arrivals, whom the Powhatans called
Tassantassas, or Strangers, into the empire he had established on Virginia's coastal plain.
Powhatan appears to have decided that the Tassantassas, with their iron tools and
terrifying weapons, were worth having as allies against inland enemies like the Siouxanspeaking Monacans who lived in the foothills of the Blue Ridge mountains. After Smith's
first visit to Powhatan at his seat at Werewocomoco in 1608, as a prisoner of a hunting
party that Opechancanough had led, the mamantowick declared a bond of friendship with
the English explorer. Smith, writing of the encounter in his 1624 book The Generall
Historie of Virginia, New England & the Summer Isles, Together with The True Travels,
Adventures and Observations, and A Sea Grammar, related that Powhatan would “for
ever esteeme him as his sonne Nantaquoud.” The mamanatowick also dispatched Smith
back to Jamestown to send him “two great gunnes and a grindstone.” 29
To Smith, the product of a patriarchal English culture, the relationship of a father
to a son would have implied that of a superior to a subordinate. However, in many
Algonquian-speaking Native American groups like the nations that made up the
Powhatan confederacy, the role of a father was one of open-handed generosity, and
Powhatan's “adoption” of Smith could easily be interpreted as a promise of future
largesse. There is less ambiguity in Powhatan's parting instructions to Smith. In directing
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Smith to obtain cannons and a grindstone for his use, the mamanatowick seems as
imperious as a European monarch assigning an errand to a trusted courtier. In his 1608
book A True Relation of Such Occurrences and Accidents of Note as Happened in
Virginia, Smith wrote that Powhatan had declared him a weroance, an unequivocal effort
to make him subordinate to the mamanatowick and, by incorporating an English leader
into his political structure, to begin absorbing the English colony into his empire.30
William Strachey’s observations of Powhatan suggest that of the seven deadly
sins that are so prominent in Christian teaching, the mamanatowick’s principle vice was
avarice. In his in-depth study of Virginia's geography, climate, natural resources, and
indigenous communities, Strachey noted that Powhatan kept a house a mile from one of
his principle towns of Orapax, which he filled with treasure that included “skynnes,
copper, perle, and beads, which he storeth upp against the tyme of his death and buryall.”
Later in his narrative, Strachey described Powhatan's effort to control the flow of
European goods, particularly copper, into his paramount chiefdom. The mamanatowick
would buy the goods for a few measures of grain, resell them to his neighbors at many
times what he had paid, and always reserve a plentiful amount of the goods for himself.31
Such efforts to manage the distribution of European trade goods among his own people
suggest an effort on Powhatan's part to assimilate those goods into the region's economic
system as he strove to absorb the traders into the local Native American political system.
Because Powhatan, who had inherited six chiefdoms in the York River drainage
and the James River basin, expanded his influence to more than 30 chiefdoms by the time
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the first English colonists arrived, it is understandable that he thought he could exert
similar influence over the new arrivals and their technology. However, there were those
close to Powhatan's seat of power who concluded that his efforts to assimilate the
Tassantassas had not been and would not be successful. Foremost among these dissenters
was the war-chief Opechancanough.
Opechancanough's background merits closer examination because of the
prominent role he would play in colonial affairs through the 1620s and 1630s and even
after his death in 1646. His exact relationship to Powhatan is unclear. He may have been
a full brother, a half-brother, or even a cousin.32 As one of Powhatan's heirs in a
matrilineal kinship system, Opechancanough became war-chief upon the former's death
in 1618, dividing the paramount chiefdom with another “brother,” Opitchapam, who
became peace-chief. Whether or not he shared power with Powhatan as he would with
Opitchapam, Opechancanough seems to have wielded considerable influence by the time
the first European settlers sailed up the James River. Gabriel Archer, one of Jamestown's
original settlers, described him as The King of Pamunkey or Pamaunche, one of
Powhatan's original inherited chiefdoms and a core of the paramount chiefdom.33
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Eighteenth century Virginia historian Robert Beverley described Opechancanough as a
man “of large stature, noble presence, and extraordinary parts.”34
Beverley’s depiction of Opechancanough as a tall, athletic man fits with Gabriel
Archer's representation of Powhatan males as “proper, lusty, straight men, very strong.”
And a contemporary illustration of John Smith taking Opechancanough prisoner shows a
somewhat undersized Englishman scuffling with a well-built Native American at least a
head taller than himself. 35

Figure 1: "C. Smith Taketh the King of Pamaunkee Prisoner, 1608." Engraved by Robert
Vaughan for John Smith's General Historie, (London, 1624).
Archer, in his account of Newport's exploration of the James River, painted a
portrait of Opechancanough as a man who was at least conscious of his dignity. As he
received Newport's party, Archer wrote Opechancanough “so set his countenance striving
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to be stately as to our seeming he became fool.”36 It is a strong possibility that Archer, a
Cambridge-educated gentleman from Essex, could have been looking at Opechancanough
not only through an Anglocentric lens, but also through a worldview in which dignity was
the exclusive privilege of English aristocrats. Where Archer found Opechancanough's
assumption of an authoritative manner somewhat ridiculous, it is also easy to see the warchief as a man of considerable pride. Affronts to that pride would have rankled, and
Opechancanough would have remembered the humiliation of an incident in 1608 when
Smith, fearing for the safety of himself and his trading party, produced a pistol and took
him hostage. Smith related that Opechancanough was “neare dead with feare,” but it is
just as easy to imagine the proud war-chief shaking with outrage at having been made a
prisoner in his own village. Opechancanough never forgave the Tassantassas for the
incident and, as later events would demonstrate, he possessed the patience to spend years
nursing a grudge and planning his revenge before taking action.37
Opechancanough had been steadily gaining political power during the last years
of Powhatan's life. By 1614, he had become “one that can as soone (if not sooner) as
Powhatan commaund the men.” With Powhatan's death and Opitchapam's ascension in
1618, it is likely that Opechancanough became mananatowick in all but name. Native
American author Linwood Custalow, a grandson of Mattaponi Chief Daniel Webster
Custalow, and American author Angela L. Daniel, wrote that Opitchapam was a weak
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leader and Beverley described him as “a Prince far short of the Parts of
Oppechancanough.”38
There exists a distinct possibility that Powhatan initially tolerated the
Tassantassas within his domain because their choice of a patch of mosquito-infected
marshland where the water was brackish for much of the year as a settlement site,
combined with their apparent inability to forage and hunt, demonstrated that the
newcomers were too inept to survive. As the Tassantassas slowly starved in the midst of
natural abundance, he, Powhatan, could acquire the iron tools, the copper, and the
firearms that the wealthy, but feckless foreigners had brought. But Powhatan had not
reckoned with a demographic explosion in England over the last half of the sixteenth
century that more than doubled the country's population by 1600. Early colonists did
indeed starve, but an overpopulated England had what may have seemed to apprehensive
Native American observers to be an inexhaustible supply of replacement personnel.39
Opechancanough, as Powhatan's primary battle commander, had a front row seat
for English colonization efforts from the first landing at Jamestown, and had witnessed
the arrival of more English ships bringing more English colonists for a decade before the
mamanatowick's death. It is difficult to imagine the war-leader watching Tassantassa
settlements claim forests where he had hunted deer and turkeys with anything other than
alarm.
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By 1620, Chickahominies, Wayanocks, and Paspaheghs had been forced off land
adjacent to English settlements, while more English settlers had begun to occupy land
belonging to the Appamattucks, Arrohatecks, Powhatans, Kecoughtans,
Quiyoughcohannocks, and Warraskoyaks. Opechancanough would almost certainly have
bristled with resentment at the strong-arm tactics of English settlers, who often traded for
or outright pilfered Native American food supplies at gunpoint. He could very well have
viewed with suspicion the English practice of trading directly with Powhatan tributary
groups like the Patawomecks. Not only did that trade represent a circumvention of the
mamanatowick's authority, it also suggested an English colonial policy of weakening
indigenous groups by fomenting dissent. Opechancanough, the Native American
equivalent of a career soldier and a veteran of Powhatan's campaigns of expansion, was
probably experienced enough to recognize a divide-and-conquer strategy when he saw
one. The most ominous development, however, may have been the establishment of an
English boarding school for young Native Americans. To Opechancanough, that school,
and the indoctrination of Powhatan children in English customs and beliefs meant the
subversion of Powhatan culture.40
For the first few years that he shared the paramount chiefdom with Opitchapam,
Opechancanough pursued a policy of conciliation regarding the Tassantassas. Upon
Powhatan’s death and their accession in 1618, the brothers jointly confirmed the peace
treaty that Powhatan and Sir Thomas Dale had negotiated in 1614. Opechancanough had
already supported the Tassantassas in a 1616 conflict with the Chickahominies, who had
refused to pay the settlers tribute in violation of the 1614 treaty that had ended the First
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Anglo-Powhatan War, although he could have been acting out of self-interest, since his
intervention in the Anglo-Chickahominy clash allowed him to absorb the remnants of the
previously autonomous Chickahominies into the Powhatan confederacy.41 When the
region's Native Americans proved reluctant to turn their children over to the Tassantassas
for fostering, Opechancanough worked out a compromise in 1619 with newly appointed
governor Sir George Yeardley whereby the English would provide Native American
families houses and fields near their settlements in order to instruct children without
separating them from their parents.42
Opechancanough was undoubtedly aware of the tactical problems he faced in any
potential military engagement against the English. His warriors could not prevail in a
pitched battle against English armor and muskets. They could not storm a well-defended
settlement in the teeth of cannon fire and protective palisades. And they had no answer
for the ships that could sail the English up and down rivers to raid Native American food
supplies and fields. Only a surprise attack could possibly defeat the interlopers, and in
order to gain that surprise, he first had to gain his enemies' trust and insert his warriors
into their midst. While Opechancanough could well have seen the new English policy of
educating Native Americans as a threat to his own culture, he must have been delighted at
the opportunity it presented to infiltrate English settlements.
Opechancanough was able to outface a rumor that had come to Yeardley from a
weroance of the Accomacs in 1621 that he planned to use the pretext of the ceremonial
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interment of Powhatan's remains to assemble warriors for an assault on English
settlements and plantations. In the fall of 1622, new Virginia governor Sir Francis Wyatt
sent Thorpe, who had built the house in which Opechancanough had taken such seeming
pleasure, as an ambassador to the war-leader. Opechancanough's declaration to Thorpe
that his traditional practices were wrong and he wished to be instructed in Christianity
was potentially an enormous triumph for the English policy of assimilation and
conversion of Native Americans for the obvious reason that a fast way to convert a
population is to convert its rulers. And when one of his greatest warriors, Nemmatanow,
known to the English colonists as “Jack of the Feathers” for the garish costume he
habitually wore, was killed in a scuffle with two settlers, Opechancanough assured a
messenger Wyatt had sent to discuss the incident that although he grieved for his fallen
weroance, Anglo-Powhatan peace was so firmly established that the sky would fall before
he broke it.43
The progress that Opechancanough made in lulling his English neighbors into the
sense of complacency that achieving an element of surprise demanded becomes clear
when one studies the gradual relaxation of English policy. In a 1618 proclamation,
Governor Samuel Argall curtly forbade any settler to teach the use of firearms to Native
Americans “on pain of death.” Argall, a veteran of the First Anglo-Powhatan War and
Pocahontas’ abductor, was clearly skeptical that the Peace of Pocahontas would hold, and
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also issued an edict against commerce or familiarity with Native Americans “lest they
discover our weekness.” Under Yeardley, the First Virginia Assembly confirmed Argall's
sanction against settlers training Native Americans in the use of firearms. The Assembly's
members were more specific than Argall in declaring that providing Native Americans
with guns, powder, or ammunition, or training them in the use of firearms was treason to
the colony and punishable by hanging. Although the Assembly passed a law allowing
small numbers of Indians to live in well-populated settlements, English suspicion of
Native Americans was plain in the members' insistence that Indian families live apart
from their white neighbors. But by 1622, Opechancanough's mask of compliance and
docility had so relaxed English security measures that settlers had begun teaching Indians
the use of firearms, which would have been a capital offense under Argall's regime, and
had employed them to hunt deer and fowl for the settlements. English colonists opened
their homes to Native Americans, who often dined at English tables and slept in English
bed-chambers. So confident were the colonists of peace between themselves and the
Powhatans, Smith wrote, that settlers began to establish plantations wherever they found
promising veins of unoccupied land. Those outlying plantations would be especially
vulnerable to Opechancanough's warriors.44
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CHAPTER II
THE 1622 UPRISING AND ITS AFTERMATH
Two Sermons in London and News From Virginia
On April 18, 1622, members of the Virginia Company of London and their wives
filed into Bow Church in the London suburb of Cheapside for a special service in
thanksgiving for the safe arrival in Virginia of nine ships carrying approximately 800
settlers. The mood was clearly a festive one, with the stockholders and their wives
dressed in their finest. Virginia Company chaplain Reverend Patrick Copland preached an
enthusiastic sermon in which he expressed his own and the congregation's joy that the
Company's ships had surmounted dangers at sea from pirates, storms, and shoals. A
veteran missionary who had traveled to India and Japan during his prior appointment as
an East India Company chaplain, Copland had firsthand experience of the hazards
associated with seventeenth century sea travel. During a 1617 voyage to India, he was
aboard the Royal James when a typhoon near the coast of Japan wrecked the Unicorn, a
ship from the convoy in which the Royal James sailed. His personal experience with
storms and shipwrecks allowed him to provide details that secondhand accounts would
likely have omitted, and it is easy to imagine his listeners' rapt expressions as he related
that “sailors are neither amongst the living, nor yet amongst the dead as, having but a few
inches of plank between them and death, they hang between both, ready to offer up their
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souls to every flaw of wind and billow of water wherein they are tossed.”45
Travelers to Virginia who survived the hazards of an ocean voyage faced more
dangers upon arrival, Copland said, and “some perished for want of comfortable
provision,” while “others were killed by the Bowes and Arrows of the Savage.”46 While
Virginia Company shareholders in England did not share the mortal peril that had faced
settlers in America, Copland pointed out that the members' fortunes had been at risk,
asking “what masse of money have you buried in that Plantation?” Many of the
stockholders must have despaired, he speculated, of ever seeing a return on their
investments, and at least some of his listeners could well have come to regret investing in
the Company's colonial venture.47
Improvements in navigation had mitigated the dangers that travelers to Virginia
faced during a trans-Atlantic voyage, Copland preached, because of the “fittest season of
the yeare for a speedie passage, being now farre better knowne then before,” while Native
American hostility and starvation were hazards of the past. Between Virginia's settlers
and the indigenous Native Americans, there had been for several years “a happie league
of peace and amity, soundly concluded and faithfully kept,” while new colonists arriving
there could count on “plenty of good and wholesome provisions,” and a “faire Inne for
receiving and harboring of strangers.” 48 The Virginia Company's stockholders, Copland
assured his listeners, had weathered the economic dangers that had threatened their
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fortunes. Thanks to an economic diversification project undertaken at the behest of King
James I and spearheaded by influential Virginia Company investor Sir Edwin Sandys, the
Virginia colony had overcome its dependence on tobacco as a cash crop and would
produce an abundance of “Corne, Wine, Oyle, Lemons, Oranges, Pomegranats, and all
manner of fruites pleasant to the eye and wholesome for the belly,” as well as silk, flax,
hemp, cotton-wool, iron, and copper. Within a few years, Copland predicted, Company
investors could hope for a return of “double, treble, yea, I may say of tenfold for one.”49
Career missionary that he was, Copland had a particular interest in the education
and conversion of the non-Christian peoples he had encountered in his travels. During his
service with the East India Company, he had educated and converted an Indian from
around the Bay of Bengal, who took the name Peter Pope and would later transcribe
Copland's sermon for publication. Returning to England from India in 1621, Copland had
encountered settlers in the West Indies who were bound for Virginia. Learning from these
travelers of a scarcity of churches and schools in Virginia, he applied for and received a
new position as a chaplain for the Virginia Company of London. He began raising funds
at home and solicited donations from his contacts in the East India Company abroad to
help open a university at Henrico, where in 1620 Virginia governor Sir George Yeardley
had set aside 10,000 acres of land for the purpose. Although he had not yet visited
Virginia, Copland expected that he would soon be bound for the colony, having been
elected rector of a school dedicated to instructing and converting Native Americans. It is
easy to imagine the joy that animated his features and lent timbre to his voice as he
delivered a report he had received in correspondence from George Thorpe, overseer of
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the college lands, that Virginia's Native Americans “seeme to groane under the burden of
the bondage of Satan, and to want nothing but meanes to be delivered.” Opechancanough
himself had “willingly acknowledged that theirs was not the right way, desiring to be
instructed in ours.”50
It is extremely likely, in light of the news from the colony in which the Virginia
Company's stockholders had invested, that a reception followed the service, replete with
the finest available food, drink, and entertainment. As the stockholders and their wives,
dressed in their finest, ate, drank, and danced, they were blissfully unaware of the turn
affairs in Virginia had taken nearly a month before.
In November, 1622, Reverend John Donne, the dean of London's St. Paul's
Cathedral, preached another sermon to Virginia Company members: a sermon whose tone
contrasted sharply with Copland's optimism. Where Copland portrayed Virginia's Native
Americans as eager for instruction in the Christian faith, Donne denounced them as
enthusiastically and unrepentantly pagan, justly detestable for the delight they
purportedly took in deceit, treachery, and violence. “As they multiply assassinations on
princes and massacres upon people, deamonium habent, they have a devil.”51
Although Patrick Copland and John Donne preached to essentially the same
congregants, the prevailing moods among their listeners would have certainly been
dramatically different. As Copland exhorted Virginia Company shareholders to offer a
prayer of thanksgiving for the safe arrival of ships and colonists in Virginia, it is likely
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that a few investors offered another such prayer for the brightening economic prospects
of which he preached. Donne's sermon came in the wake of much grimmer news than
Copland's, and would certainly have created a bleaker atmosphere in St. Paul's Cathedral.
The same Virginia Company shareholders who had rubbed their hands together in
anticipation of the profits that Copland had predicted probably shuddered not only at
Donne's description of the “flood of blood,” that had broken over Virginia, but also at the
prospect of seeing their fortunes wash away in that flood.52
Donne seems to have been aware of his listeners' fiscal concerns, but does not
appear to have been particularly interested in alleviating those apprehensions. God had
ordained, he preached, that the temporal kingdom of Virginia would have “not ease, not
abundance; nay, nothing at all yet.” But settlers in Virginia and Virginia Company
investors could still do great service to the eternal kingdom, which Donne presented as
far more important than any temporal kingdom. The plantation of Virginia, Donne
preached, would “redeem many a wretch from the jaws of death,” or “from the hand of
the executioner,” meaning that Christian settlement among non-Christian Native
Americans would ultimately rescue Native American souls that would otherwise have
perished.53
In addition to providing the opportunity to convert Native Americans to
Christianity, Donne saw merit in the plantation of Virginia in that it cleared England of
“idle persons, and the children of idle persons,” and found them employment. Moreover,
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Donne said in a brief acknowledgment of his congregation's collective economic worries,
the commodities that had reached Europe from Virginia in the 15 years of the colony's
existence had already made the plantation a mark for the envy of England's Spanish and
French rivals. In short, the colony was a worthwhile endeavor even in the face of the
mortal danger that Virginia's settlers faced and the financial ruin that menaced Virginia
Company investors after the 1622 Uprising.54
Donne’s advocacy of laboring to convert Native Americans to European values
and practices was representative of a policy that Virginia’s governing body, the Council
in Virginia, had pursued for the past eight years. But in the aftermath of the Uprising, his
call for cooperation and conversion in the face of hostility and hardship appears to have
been drowned out in the chorus of incensed voices baying for retribution. Those voices
would influence English policy toward Native Americans not only in Virginia, but in
New England as well.
Between Copland's April sermon and Donne's discourse in November, word had
reached England of a coordinated Powhatan attack on English settlements along the
James River. The news came in the form of a letter from the colony’s governor, Sir
Francis Wyatt, to the Virginia Company. The Powhatans, Wyatt wrote, had “under the
Colour of unsuspected amity,” attempted “to have Swept us away through owte the whole
lande had it nott plesed god of his abundante mercy to prevent them in many places.”55
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It is not difficult to hold up Patrick Copland as a victim of one of history's great
ironies. But in the absence of updates from Virginia, which did not reach England until
two months after he preached his sermon, his vision of a prosperous future for English
colonization efforts in North America appeared well-founded. The first years of the
Virginia colony’s existence, Copland conceded, had been discouraging, to say the least.
But Virginia’s first hard years seemed to be in the past.
The “happie league of peace and amity,” between Virginia's English colonists and
the nations of the Powhatan confederacy that Copland described in his sermon was
unequivocally at an end.56 New arrivals in Virginia would find themselves, contrary to
Copland's assurances, fighting for their lives against hostile natives, as well as food
shortages that so commonly accompany warfare, and diseases that so commonly
accompany food shortages. The economic diversification project in Virginia lay in ruins
because of Powhatan destruction of settlers' fields, vineyards, and groves.
William Capps, a representative for Elizabeth City County in Virginia's First
General Assembly, succinctly and vividly summed up the astonishment, grief, and despair
that many settlers must have felt when he wrote “God forgive me, I thinke the last
massacre killed all our Countrie, beside them they killed, they burst the heart of all the
rest."57 Capps is known to have agitated for the English crown to take control of the
colony, and it is possible that he misrepresented popular sentiment in Virginia in an effort
to discredit the Virginia Company's management of colonial affairs. Given the relative
magnitude of the disaster that had befallen the colony, however, Capps is unlikely to have
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exaggerated the shock and apprehension that must have still prevailed among the
surviving colonists. That distress and trepidation sailed across the Atlantic Ocean and
arrived with news of the assault in mid-June. The Virginia Company's reply to Wyatt's
report conveyed the members' extreme grief about events in the colony, and English
lawyer and poet Christopher Brooke lamented that “my Passion rent my heart with
sorrow for that dyre event” in a poem written in the summer of 1622.58
When surviving colonists in Virginia and investors and policymakers in England
had recovered from the shockwave that reports of the Uprising had undoubtedly brought,
anger followed astonishment and pain. That anger, and an accompanying call for revenge,
is manifest in a variety of sources. Virginia Company secretary Edward Waterhouse
described the Powhatans as “perfidious and inhumane people,” and pronounced the
attacks on English settlements to be “contrary to all lawes of God and men, of Nature
&Nations.” English clergyman Reverend Samuel Purchas, who published several
volumes reporting on the travels of Europeans to foreign countries, stressed the perceived
treachery, cruelty, and savagery of the Powhatans in his exploration of affairs in the
Virginia colony. And Christopher Brooke made the transition from shock and grief to
loathing and anger in his poem when he wrote of “that Hoast of Hells black brood,
Wolves, Tygars, and Tyrants, that have lickt the blood Of Christian Soules.” 59
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Both Waterhouse and Brooke presented the Powhatans, and perhaps Native
Americans in general, as less than human. Waterhouse specifically referred to the
Powhatans as “beasts,” and Brooke highlighted their perceived bestiality throughout his
poem. The implications of dehumanizing terms in writing or speaking of the Powhatans
becomes particularly ominous when one considers that the use of dehumanizing language
has, throughout history, often been a prelude to a genocidal campaign.
The Day the Sky Fell
On the morning of March 22, 1622, at English settlements and plantations along
the James River from the site of present-day Richmond to Hampton Roads, where the
river empties into the Chesapeake Bay, Indians from various tribes of the Powhatan
confederacy approached colonists in a friendly fashion. Many brought deer, turkeys, and
fish to trade for European goods. Some entered the homes of settlers and joined them for
breakfast, while others worked alongside the colonists at their daily chores. By this time,
such visits had become routine. Wyatt's policy since his arrival in Virginia seems to have
been to encourage such interaction, and Native Americans often borrowed settlers' tools
or boats. As the Powhatans ate with their Tassantassa hosts, haggled with Tassantassa
traders, or worked alongside Tassantassa farmers, they are likely to have kept one eye on
the position of the sun. Edward Waterhouse compiled a report of what happened next
from interviews with and letters from surviving Virginia colonists. The resulting
document, “A Declaration of the State of the Colony and Affaires in Virginia,” is the most
detailed account of an attack that left 347 settlers dead or missing. Waterhouse's report
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provided a list of English casualties in each district, a useful resource in that it supplied
information as to which areas of the colony were hardest hit.60
At the prearranged time, the Powhatans, who had approached the settlements and
plantations with no weapons showing, picked up whatever tools or weapons were at
hand. A colonist weeding his tobacco field may have had his skull split by a hoe while
another, entertaining a Powhatan breakfast guest, could have been run through with a
carving knife or impaled on a cooking spit. The stroke was so sudden, Waterhouse wrote,
that “few or none discerned the weapon or blow that brought them to destruction.”61
Waterhouse expressed the belief that the slaughter of colonists would have been
universal had it not been for a timely warning. A converted Indian living with a tobacco
planter named Richard Pace, had been approached by his brother the previous day. The
brother had informed him of the coming attack and urged him to kill Pace. Instead, the
Powhatan convert warned Pace, who rowed across the James River at midnight to warn
Wyatt at Jamestown. The scene Waterhouse depicted conjures a host of images: the
Christianized Indian hiding his horror at the threat to a man he presumably saw as his
benefactor, Pace's frantic departure to cross a three-mile wide river in the darkness, a
rumpled and bleary-eyed Wyatt roused from bed to receive Pace's news and act on it.
Waterhouse did not give the name of the Christianized Indian who warned Pace. But an
April, 1623 letter to the Virginia Company from the Council in Virginia mentioned a man
named Chauco, who had revealed Opechancanough's plot. Opechancanough seems to
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have been unaware of Chauco's purported defection, because the Council reported that
the latter had recently come to Jamestown as part of an embassy to the English.
Eighteenth-century Virginia historian William Stith was perhaps the first writer to corrupt
the name Chauco into Chanco, the name by which the young Native American convert is
probably best known today. While a Native American youth who was employed at the
plantation of one William Perry indeed warned Perry's neighbor, Richard Pace, of the
coming attack and Pace subsequently warned Wyatt, Chauco or Chanco was probably an
amalgam of several Powhatans who informed English neighbors of the imminent
danger.62
Wyatt appears to have acted decisively on short notice, securing the fort, and
repulsing a Powhatan attack in the morning. The distance from Jamestown to settlements
like Henrico, nearly 50 miles, was too great for any messengers Wyatt may have
dispatched to raise the alarm in time for colonists in those areas to prepare for the coming
assault. Wyatt's primary concern seems to have been defending the center of the colony's
government from a surprise attack, because the private plantation of Martin's Hundred,
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just seven miles from Jamestown, had
clearly received no warning of a coming
assault.
Waterhouse reported that more than
70 colonists died at Martin's Hundred, but
presumed the deaths of 20 women who had
merely been taken prisoner, and lived
among the Powhatans after the Uprising.63

Figure 2: “The massacre of the settlers in 1622,” engraved by Matthaus Merian the Elder
for America, Part XIII, German edition, (Frankfurt, 1628).
At Berkley's Hundred plantation, near present-day Richmond, George Thorpe had
received a warning of the attack much like Chanco's warning to Pace. Thorpe had built
the English-style house in which Opechancanough took such seeming delight. He had
been Wyatt's messenger to the Powhatans, the overseer of the lands that Henrico College
occupied, and a leading proponent of integrating Native Americans into colonial English
society. He seems to have firmly believed he had earned his Powhatan neighbors’
goodwill many times over and disregarded the warning, unable to believe he could be in
any danger. Thorpe apparently persisted with that belief right up until the Powhatans
killed him. Opechancanough may have specifically wished to make an example of this

Waterhouse, “A Declaration of the State of the Colony and Affaires in Virginia,” in Kingsbury ed., The
Records of the Virginia Company of London, V.3, 570; Fausz, “The Missing Women of Martin's Hundred,”
American History, V. 33, No. 1 (March, 1998), 57-58; Rountree, Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough,
168.
63

43

leading agent of English cultural imperialism, because Thorpe's corpse was singled out
for “barbarous despights and foules scornes … as are unbefitting to be heard by any civill
eare.” Because of Thorpe’s missionary work among the Powhatans, Waterhouse declared
that he had “gained a Crowne of endlesse blisse, and is assuredly become a glorious
Martyr.”
Other notable English casualties included three other members of the Council in
Virginia: Captain Nathaniel Powell, Captain Samuel Macock, and John Berkeley. At
Falling Creek, a settlement about 60 miles from Jamestown and the site of Berkeley's
plantation, the entire English population of 27 men, women, and children perished. The
name of John Rolfe was not listed among the casualties of the uprising, but it is known
that he had returned to Virginia in 1619 after Pocahontas’ death in England, and he is
known to have died in 1622. But while the possibility exists that Rolfe perished in the
Uprising, it is unlikely that Waterhouse would have omitted so famous a colonist from the
casualty list he had so painstakingly compiled.64
Although early spring would seem to have been a poor time to begin a military
campaign due to a lack of food supplies and the need to plant crops for the coming year,
Opechancanough saw distinct advantages in waging war during the season that Virginia's
Algonquin-speaking Indians called cattapeuk, because the Tassantassas would not be
able to retaliate against the warriors' loved ones. Powhatan families traditionally
dispersed from their populations centers at the end of winter to fish and forage. The end
of winter meant that travel would have been easier for the messengers Opechancanough
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needed to send in coordinating the attack, while the debilitating heat of summer was
months away. The season of taquitock, which corresponded to the European autumn,
would have also been an opportune time for the Powhatans to initiate conflict with the
English because it was another cycle in which families dispersed on fishing and foraging
expeditions. Opechancanough's apparent concern for the time of year in which he
launched his attack strongly suggests that he had not planned on an extended campaign,
hoping that he would achieve his objectives before summer, when his warriors would
have had to battle heat and pestilence as well as English muskets.65
According to Waterhouse, the Powhatans did not distinguish between man or
woman, adult or child in their killing of settlers. This disregard for age or sex was almost
certainly an innovation learned from the English, because Powhatans traditionally killed
only adult male enemies while abducting or adopting women and children. Conversely,
George Percy, who served as acting President of the Council in Virginia from September,
1609 to May, 1610, related a 1610 incident in which English soldiers executed an
unspecified number of captured Paspehegh children by throwing them into the James
River and shooting at their bobbing heads. 66
Where Europeans of the early seventeenth century waged war primarily for
territorial acquisition, Native Americans of the region engaged in armed conflict to
avenge insults or to boost their populations through abduction and adoption, although
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control of resources also was a key factor in Native American warfare. With the different
understanding of military objectives inherent in their respective cultures, it is not
surprising that the Powhatans would misinterpret how the English interlopers would
respond to the coordinated assault of March 22.67
Waterhouse's contention that the slaughter of Virginia colonists would have been
universal had it not been for Pace's warning to Jamestown was almost certainly incorrect.
The 1622 Uprising was a fairly representative example of Powhatan tactics and strategy.
Powhatan had employed the tactic of infiltrating an enemy's settlement with a friendly
approach before attacking in his conquest of the Piankatanks, undertaken before the
disruptive arrival of English settlers in his newly-won empire. In contrast to Waterhouse's
suggestion that the Powhatans had intended nothing less than the murder of every
European man, woman, and child in the region, Opechancanough's objective was
probably merely to flex his military muscle or to demonstrate to the Tassantassas that
they had worn out their welcome. Helen C. Rountree and James Horn speculate that
Opechancanough's ultimate goal was to drive the surviving settlers back to Europe.
According to Alfred A. Cave however, he may have hoped to confine the English to a
small territory and end English efforts to convert the Powhatans to Christianity. Frederic
Gleach asserts that Opechancanough valued the colonists for their trade goods, and only
wished to discipline them, not expel them. It is possible that Opechancanough sought to
contain the colonists to a small area in hopes of triggering a second Starving Time, which
would cause the discouraged settlers to simply board ships and return to England, as they
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had so nearly done in 1610. But it is more likely that he merely wished to end English
encroachment on Powhatan land and attempted subversion of Powhatan culture.68
The fact that Jamestown, Newport News, Elizabeth City, and plantations on
Virginia's Eastern Shore were left untouched during the March 22 attacks lends
significant weight to the position that Opechancanough’s goal was not the extermination
of every European in the region. Opechancanough possessed ample manpower to
continue his campaign against the Tassantassas, and the success of his surprise attacks
had given him a tactical advantage. While it is not clear what sort of manpower
Opechancanough had at his disposal, his main attack force consisted of 500-600 elite
Powhatan and Pamunkey warriors and hundreds of auxiliaries. Population estimates of
the Powhatan empire from John Smith and William Strachey listed the number of
warriors in each of the Powhatan towns. Strachey's estimate of the military strength of
each town was generally higher than Smith's whenever the two sources differed, but the
total number of warriors in both calculations was between 2,000 and 2,500. They would
have had a significant numerical advantage over the surviving Virginia colonists, and
weight of numbers has counted as a telling tactical advantage for as long as warfare has
existed. In addition, the Powhatans had seized control of the countryside and its
resources, gaining another classic tactical advantage by denying those resources to his
enemies. However, Native American reluctance to attack fortified positions is likely to
have been a factor in Opechancanough's decision not to launch more attacks.
Opechancanough simply did not have an answer for English palisades and entrenched
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English artillery, and could never have overrun fortified English enclaves. The assertion
that Opechancanough's objective was to either expel or contain the Tassantassas is almost
certainly correct. But since Opechancanough never divulged his military aims to his
English enemies, whether he conceived his strategy of containment to starve the Virginia
colony into submission, as Powhatan so nearly succeeded in doing a decade before, or to
modify the colonists' behavior must remain a matter of speculation almost 400 years
later.69
The English Regroup
A series of commissions to Hamor and Captain Roger Smith shows that during
the month following the attack, Wyatt was ordering the evacuation of outlying
settlements like Henrico and Coxendale to the fortified settlements of Jamestown,
Elizabeth City, Charles City, and Newport News, effectively placing the colony under
martial law. John Smith described the consolidation of Virginia’s population as the
establishment of an English peninsula between the James and York rivers in the north and
south, Chesapeake Bay in the east, and the Chickahominy River to the west. On Henrico
Island, Alice Proctor, who had armed her servants and defended her plantation against the
Indians, found that she could not hold off Wyatt’s order to evacuate to Jamestown. Militia
troops reportedly threatened to burn down her house if she did not accompany them, as
the Powhatans did after her departure.70
Wyatt did not draft his report of the attack to the Company until after April 20.
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The delay in reporting to the Company was probably due to Wyatt's need to assess the
damage to the colony and regroup the survivors, as well as having to wait until the Sea
Flower, the ship that would carry news of the attack back to England, was ready to sail.
But it is possible to picture Wyatt as reluctant to admit to his employers that the policy he
had supported of peaceful coexistence with the Powhatans had failed in a spectacular
fashion. Indeed, the Company’s Treasurer and Council began their August reply with
something of a dressing-down, rebuking Wyatt for being surprised in a time of known
danger, and for dismissing the warning of Opechancanough’s hostile designs that he had
received the previous year. Wyatt’s stupidity in not detecting and suppressing such an
open conspiracy, the Company’s officers declared, had made him an instrument through
which Opechancanough carried out his designs which “the least wisdome or courage
suffised to prevent even on the point of execution.”71
If Opechancanough had intended to eliminate the colony’s European population,
as Waterhouse claimed, he would have needed to overrun the fortified English
settlements. For that venture to succeed, he would have required the element of complete
surprise, which was lost when Richard Pace completed his midnight crossing of the
James.
Shortly after the March 22 attacks, Opechancanough had allegedly boasted to a
Patawomeck weroance that within two months, there would not be an Englishman left in
their country. The weroance subsequently reported the boast to English trader Captain
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Raleigh Croshaw who, in a natural course of events, passed the information along to
Wyatt and the Council in Virginia. The veracity of the source in which the account of
Opechancanough’s boast appeared, The Generall History of Virginia, New England & the
Summer Isles, is questionable. Smith, having left Virginia never to return 15 years before
completing The Generall History, evidently retained an avid interest in the colony for the
rest of his life. It stands to reason that he would have kept abreast of developments in
Virginia. But the news he received would of necessity have been secondhand, and would
have reflected pro-English, anti-Powhatan biases. Additionally, The Generall History
contained events from Smith’s time in Virginia that he did not record in A True Relation
of Such Occurrences and Accidents of Note as Happened in Virginia. Because The
Generall History was published during the Second Anglo-Powhatan War, it is easy to
interpret Smith’s narrative as part of an English propaganda effort to depict the
Powhatans as murderous barbarians. The grim promise that Opechancanough allegedly
made could well have represented Smith’s portrayal of a bloodthirsty savage.72
If Opechancanough assumed that his English opponents would behave like
Native American adversaries after a military defeat and withdraw to their home territory,
that assumption would indicate a lack of understanding regarding cultural differences, an
unlikely oversight in light of the fact that he had as much exposure to Tassantassa ways
as his late brother, Powhatan. Such a conjecture would also have shown a failure to
appreciate the difficulties of such an evacuation. An ocean separated Virginia’s colonists
from an overpopulated homeland that would have had no space, and certainly no
economic opportunities for them. Indeed, one of the key reasons Donne offered in his
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sermon at St. Paul’s for the continuation of English settlement in Virginia was that the
colony would “sweep our streets and wash our doors of idle persons and the children of
idle persons,” and provide them with productive work. If Virginia’s sole purpose were to
force England’s unemployed to work, Donne added, then that single function was
sufficient to justify the colony’s continued existence.73
While Donne obtained news of the Uprising secondhand, Wyatt had a front-row
seat for the event, and drafted the first of the reports that would shock England. His
failure to incorporate the Powhatans into the colony he governed and his proximity to
hundreds of now-hostile Native Americans do not seem to have diminished Wyatt’s
commitment to remaining in Virginia. In his April, 1622 letter to the Virginia Company,
he requested food to sustain the colonists who were bottled up in their fortified
settlements. He requested weapons that would help the colonists defend themselves
against Indian attacks. Significantly, Wyatt not only did not ask for a fleet to evacuate the
surviving colonists back to Europe, but instead asked the Company to recruit additional
settlers and provide them with tools for farming, clearing land, and improving
fortifications. Clearly, he did not see evacuating the colony as a viable option.74
On the other side of the Atlantic, the Virginia Company demonstrated its
members’ reluctance to abandon their colonial venture by recruiting hundreds of new
settlers, the first of which arrived on the ship bearing the Treasurer and Council for
Virginia’s reply to Wyatt. The Treasurer and Council did not snub these new colonists in
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Donne’s terms as idle persons to be swept from England’s streets and washed from
England’s doors. Instead, the Company’s letter to Wyatt stressed the importance of the
new arrivals, giving them a sort of nobility of purpose in declaring that “in the multitude
of people is the strength of a kingdom.”75
While potential colonists were not in short supply in England, grain apparently
was: not a surprising phenomenon in an overpopulated country. Virginia Company
officials confessed that they saw little possibility of satisfying Wyatt’s request for
additional food with “the publique stock being utterly as you know exhausted.” There
were undoubtedly many Virginia colonists who questioned whether the addition of
hundreds of hungry settlers who would have to exist on dwindling local food stores
would strengthen the colony, as the Virginia Company so blithely promised. But if the
Company could not assure that the recruited colonists would be well-fed upon their
arrival, its members ensured that the new arrivals would be well-armed through their
procurement of an assortment of armor and weapons from the arsenal of the Tower of
London. It is likely that the members of the Company’s council believed that Wyatt could
only improve Virginia’s economic circumstances by improving the colony’s military
circumstances. Clearly, Company officials expected the governor to regain the areas that
settlers had abandoned in the aftermath of the Uprising, stating that “the replanting of
them is of absolute necessity.” The recruitment of new settlers appears to have been
among Waterhouse’s key objectives when he wrote “A Declaration of the State of the
Colony and Affaires in Virginia.” He lauded Virginia’s natural abundance in extravagant
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terms and at extravagant length, appealed to English national pride in the pursuit of “this
Noble Enterprise” of colonization, and promised perspective colonists 100 acres of land
on the Virginia Company’s behalf. Plainly, the Company had no intention of abandoning
the project to which it had committed so many people and so many resources.76
Ultimately, Gleach’s contention that Opechancanough’s goal in launching a
surprise attack on English settlements and plantations to contain the foreign interlopers
seems more logical than the theory that his aim was to exterminate or expel the
Tassantassas. Given the impossibility of storming fortified positions, Opechancanough
may have given up the lands in which the Tassantassas concentrated their population as
lost. As intimately familiar with his unwanted English neighbors as he would have
become during the years that he acceded to English demands, Opechancanough almost
certainly had some idea of the challenges involved in dismantling an entire colony and
transporting settlers back to an England that held few prospects for them. It is possible
that he was indifferent to what would become of the invaders, so long as they ceased to
trouble his people, but he could not have been unaware that they would resist the idea of
abandoning what for many settlers represented their only chance at prosperity. And while
most narratives, both primary and secondary, depict Opechancanough as strictly a warrior
while displaying Powhatan’s acquisitive side, the war-leader was probably not indifferent
to the value of European goods in a Native American trading network.
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If Opechancanough had sought to confine the Tassantassas to a small cluster of
settlements and discourage efforts to incorporate the region’s Indians into their colony,
then his success was fleeting. Wyatt and the Council in Virginia did indeed order the
consolidation of the colony’s surviving population, and English efforts at education and
conversion of Native Americans certainly died with the first English casualty of the
Uprising. But in the intervening months, Powhatans must have watched with growing
apprehension as ships sailed into the Chesapeake Bay and up the James River to deposit
more of England’s surplus population on Virginia’s shores. It must surely have occurred
to Opechancanough that the fortified peninsula to which the Tassantassas had withdrawn
would never support all of the new arrivals, and the Tassantassas therefore had no
intention of remaining restricted to that peninsula.
Proclamations against such mundane offenses as drunkenness, swearing, taking of
boats without permission, and stealing of oars indicate that by June, some semblance of
normalcy had returned to colonial life as Wyatt and the Council awaited the Virginia
Company’s reply to their report on the Uprising. The next year, Wyatt would set a
historical precedent for the modern commemoration of surprise attacks with an executive
order to keep March 22 holy. Wyatt’s call for a day of prayer and thanksgiving in
consideration of “Gods most mercifull deliverance of so many in the Cuntrie of Virginia
from the treachery of the Indian,” held the unwritten, but easy to discern message that
Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic should never forget that perceived treachery.
Nor would Opechancanough’s surprise attack be forgiven, as aroused and reinforced
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settlers gathered their strength and armed themselves for military action calculated to
make the Powhatans believe that the sky had indeed fallen. 77
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CHAPTER III
SHORT-TERM CONSEQUENCES
English Rage Fuels English Policy
The first rumblings of the outrage felt in England when news of the Uprising
arrived on the Sea Flower in the summer of 1622 reached Virginia with the Company’s
reply to Wyatt and the Council. Although primarily concerned with chastising Wyatt and
the Council, and dictating the colony’s next course of action, the Virginia Company’s
officers managed passing references to the Powhatans, and perhaps to Native Americans
in general as “men so contemptible,” who practiced evil customs. In an unmistakable call
for decisive military action, the Company concluded that Virginia’s colonists could never
again trust the goodwill of “so cursed a nation, ungratefull to all benefitte, and uncapable
of all goodnesse,” and at the very least should forcibly affect the removal of Native
Americans from the vicinity of English settlements. It is very easy to view the
Company’s instructions to the Council in Virginia as a precedent for a practice that
English settlers would follow as their mother country deposited more and more of its
surplus population on North America’s shores, and as an approach to Native American
relations that remained in force well after England’s North American colonies gained
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their independence and became the United States of America.78
Donne advocated continued missionary work in his sermon to the Company at St.
Paul’s, and John Martin, who had served as a member of the first Council in Virginia,
submitted an essay to the Company in December, 1622, that argued for the subjugation,
rather than the removal or extermination, of the Powhatans. Like Donne, Martin believed
that the Virginia colony represented hope for the salvation of Native Americans, and their
removal from the vicinity of Christians who could save them through conversion would
doom their souls for eternity. However, Martin seemed to place more importance on the
service the Powhatans did for the colony by killing wolves and bears that would
otherwise pose a threat to the settlers’ livestock.79
Voices like Donne’s and Martin’s seem to have been drowned out in a widespread
outcry for revenge, with writers like Waterhouse and Brooke fanning the flames. Far from
saving the colonists’ cattle from predatory animals, the Powhatans were themselves
rapacious beasts “more fell then Lyons and Dragons.” Three months before Donne urged
continued efforts to educate and convert Virginia’s Native Americans, Purchas, the rector
of St. Martin’s parish in Ludgate, thundered from an open-air pulpit at St. Paul’s Cross in
London that Englishmen would soon wash their feet in the blood of “those native
unnatuall Traytors”. Virginia Company policymakers seemed to agree with Martin that
Native Americans could make a valuable labor force in the development of Virginia.
But where Martin, apparently a staunch adherent of the Company’s recently
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abandoned policy of coexistence with and education of Native Americans, advocated the
recruitment of willing Native American laborers, the Company’s officers had little
concern for the willingness of a potential Indian work force. In the beginning of an
English experiment with Native American slave labor, the Company’s treasurer and
council advised Wyatt to spare young Powhatan prisoners of both sexes “whose bodies
may, by labor and service become profitable.”80
Along with ordering military action against the Powhatans and providing Wyatt
with additional settlers and weapons to make that action a practical option, the Virginia
Company also outlined methods by which the colonists could affect the forcible removal
of Native Americans from the vicinity of English settlements and plantation. Not
surprisingly, given the fact that an ocean separated Virginia from its supply lines, the
Company recommended the seizure of Powhatan food stores and the destruction of
Powhatan cornfields. Additionally, the Company recommended the establishment of a
standing militia in Virginia to intercept Powhatan hunting parties, burn their towns,
destroy their boats, and generally deny them “whatsoever may yeeld them succor or
relief.” The various Indians who had warned colonists of Opechancanough’s designs, the
Treasurer and Council opined, were due a “good respect and recompence,” in the form of
continued indoctrination in English ways “whereby they may be made capable of further
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benefitte and favor.” In short, their demonstrated subservience to English colonists had
made them worthy to remain in the vicinity of English settlements, so long as they did so
on English terms.81
While the Uprising did not impact Wyatt’s determination to maintain an English
presence in Virginia, it brought about a dramatic change in his attitude toward his Native
American neighbors. A leading advocate of peaceful coexistence with the region’s
Indians before Opechancanough’s attacks, he concluded shortly after the Uprising that
the expulsion of the region’s Indians was Virginia’s first priority. Settlers would be
infinitely better with no Indians among them, Wyatt wrote, than to have peaceful Native
American neighbors whom he declared to be thorns in the colony’s side at the best of
times. Alden T. Vaughan viewed Wyatt’s statement as a forecast of English posture
toward Native Americans for the remainder of the seventeenth century: one of
unrelenting enmity and almost complete separation.82
The Virginia Company seems to have wasted little time disseminating proVirginia, anti-Powhatan propaganda to the English public. Just over a month after the Sea
Flower arrived in London bearing news of the Uprising, the Company had published
Waterhouse’s report as a broadsheet. Waterhouse opened “A Declaration of the State of
Affaires in Virginia,” by praising the region’s natural beauty and abundance at great
length in an obvious effort to tempt prospective settlers. His description of the richness of
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Virginia’s soil would have been especially alluring in a small, overpopulated island
nation where land, the measure of wealth in seventeenth-century Europe, was in short
supply.
Having piqued the greed of potential colonists, he then fed their anger with a lurid
depiction of the Uprising, during which the Powhatans, not content with merely killing
their English victims, “fell after againe upon the dead, making as well as they could a
fresh murder, defacing, dragging, and mangling the dead carkasses into many pieces, and
carrying some parts away in derision, with base and brutish triumph.” It is somewhat
surprising that Waterhouse, in his graphic allegations of Native American savagery, did
not speculate that the parts of slain colonists that the Powhatans reportedly carried back
to their towns were destined for communal cooking pots. Certainly, he had a clear
opportunity to accuse Virginia’s Native American enemies of what may be one of
mankind’s greatest taboos, and allegations of cannibalism would have fit in with his
attempt to make the Powhatans seem as abhorrent as possible to his English readers.83
“A Declaration of the State of the Colony and Affaires in Virginia,” derived its
considerable influence from Waterhouse’s contention that the 1622 Uprising was actually
advantageous to the colony in the long run. First, he declared, the Powhatans had
revealed themselves as enemies of God through their treacherous violence against
Christians. Because they were brutal and duplicitous enemies of God, Christian colonists
were free to act against them, whereas their hands had previously been “tied
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with gentlenesse and fair usage.” By turning their laborious mattocks into victorious
swords, Waterhouse wrote, colonists in Virginia could claim the region’s best farmland,
while they had previously subsisted on what he saw as land that the Indians did not want.
Additionally, the deer and other game animals would increase when the Indians who
hunted them had been driven out of the region, as would English livestock. Waterhouse’s
view of the Powhatans as a threat to English livestock was diametrically opposed to
Martin’s portrayal of the indigenous Native Americans of defenders of that livestock
through their hunting of predators. It is ironic that Waterhouse expressed concern for the
game animals whose natural habitat English colonists were actively levelling for
farmland.84
Conquering the Powhatans, Waterhouse asserted, would be easier than
“civilizing” them, because they were “scattered in small companies, which are helps to
Victorie, but are hindrances to Civilitie.” Like Martin, Waterhouse recognized the
potential value of Native American labor in Virginia, and because of their demonstrated
hostility, the Powhatans could “most justly be compelled to servitude and drudgery.”
Prophetically, Waterhouse stated that Opechancanough’s attacks had taught Virginia’s
colonists and their Virginia Company backers that “he who trusts not is not deceived.” It
is reasonable to suggest that the Euro-American distrust of Native Americans and the
determined Euro-American displacement of Native Americans were rooted in
Waterhouse’s 1622 assessment of Anglo-Indian affairs in Virginia.85
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Waterhouse was quite explicit in the ways by which Virginia’s colonists could
conquer and expel the Powhatans. Like the Treasurer and Council of the Virginia
Company, Waterhouse proposed raids on Powhatan towns, destruction of Powhatan
goods, harvesting Powhatan fields at gunpoint, and surprise attacks on Powhatan hunting
and foraging parties. What particularly stands out about Waterhouse’s report was his
persistent dehumanization of Native Americans, advocating the pursuit of them with
horses, bloodhounds, and mastiffs, using essentially the same methods they would have
employed to eradicate wolves and foxes in Europe.86
Citing the efforts of a rival European power in the early competition for
preeminence in North America, Waterhouse related the success of Spanish colonizers in
using Native American quarrels and rivalries to their own advantage in their sixteenth
century conquests of Mexico and Peru. Forty years earlier, Richard Hakluyt had written
in gruesome detail about the cruelty of Spanish conquistadores on Native Americans,
describing how they “ripped their bellies and cut them in peces as if they had bene
openinge of lambes shutt up in their folde,” and trained hounds to “teare them in peces at
the first view.” Such atrocities, Hakluyt wrote, had made Spain’s agents of colonization
odious to the people over which they ruled. In a 1609 Virginia Company promotional
tract, London Alderman and prominent Company investor Robert Johnson boasted that
England would gain a foothold in the New World not through use of swords and muskets,
as the Spanish had established a base in the West Indies, but through “faire and loving
meanes fitting to our English natures.” Given the repudiation of Spanish methods that
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earlier advocates of English colonization professed, Waterhouse’s assertion that Spain’s
example was one for English colonists to emulate represented a dramatic change in
attitude.87
Making divisions among the region’s various Native American groups would be
easy because many of those groups already hated the Powhatans “that have beene likely
as false and perfidious to them, as unto us of late.” Undoubtedly, the conquests of the
Powhatans before the arrival of the English had generated some resentment on the part of
the peoples they had conquered, But the divide-and-conquer tactics that Waterhouse
prescribed probably met with limited success, as armed settlers often did not stop to
distinguish friend from foe before firing on Native Americans after the 1622 Uprising. 88
Because Waterhouse’s diatribe appeared in a Virginia Company publication, the
views he expressed presumably carried the Company’s imprimatur. Because the
Company appointed the members of Virginia’s governing body during its management of
the colony, Waterhouse’s recommendations therefore can be said to have carried the
weight of official policy.
Wyatt appears to have anticipated the Virginia Company’s instructions to let the
Powhatans have “warre without peace or truce.” Before receiving the Company’s
instructions, the Governor in Virginia issued a commission to his predecessor, Sir George
Yeardley, instructing him to recruit militia, travel to the York River and around the
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Chesapeake Bay, and “make war, kill, spoile, or take by force or otherwise whatsoever
boote of Corne, or anything else he can attaine unto, from any the Salvadges or enemies.”
After the meticulously planned and coordinated March 22 attacks, Opechancanough and
the Powhatans had settled into the time-honored siege tactic of denying the countryside
and its resources to the Tassantassas. Wyatt, having reinforced the colony’s ranks,
regrouped in fortified positions, and replenished Virginia’s armory, was clearly planning
to break out of the settlements to claim the countryside and its resources.89
The first few years of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War were years of depredation
for all participants. At the outset, the Powhatans had several distinct advantages over their
European opponents. Unless they were actually under attack, they enjoyed freedom of
movement that the entrenched English lacked. Both sides raided the other’s food
supplies, creating a shortage of grain all around, but the Powhatans, better knowing the
land, knew how to subsist on wild plants including tuckahoe, a starchy root that grew in
the swamps. There can be little doubt that mutual destruction of cornfields caused more
suffering among the English, who lacked such intimate knowledge of the forests and
marshes, than it did among the Powhatans. Bottled up in their settlements, between 500
and 600 colonists would die of disease and starvation. Wyatt’s commission to Hamor in
October, 1622, stating the necessity that “by war or trade, Corne be procured from the
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Indians,” showed that obtaining food was the colony’s first priority. In the next two
months, Wyatt issued similar commissions to Captains William Eden, Isaac Maddison,
William Tucker, and Robert Bennett, further demonstrating the urgency he felt in feeding
the colony. Maddison’s trading expedition to the neutral Patawomecks was an
unmitigated disaster. His suspicions aroused by a guide’s rumor that the Patawomecks
were plotting with Opechancanough to attack his party, Maddison ordered an assault on a
Patawomeck town, killing between 30 and 40 Indians. The Accomacs of the Eastern
Shore seem to have been the only Native American group to maintain any sort of cordial
relations with the English. Hamor’s expeditions to the Accomacs in the summer of 1622
yielded the colony eight bushels of maize, and Tucker was able to procure another 12
bushels from the same source. Wyatt and the Council were obviously not going to feed
the colony through trade, but raids on Indian food supplies yielded thousands of bushels
of corn.90
The Virginia Company’s advice to Wyatt after the Uprising included an injunction
to “roote out from being any longer a people” the Powhatans who had so violently
rejected English culture and faith and were therefore unworthy to live in proximity to
English settlements. Waterhouse wrote admiringly of the efforts of sixteenth century
Spanish colonists in the West Indies who, through 40 years of warfare, denial of food
sources, and exacerbation of local quarrels to their own advantage, reduced the Indian
population there from more than a million to about 500. Taken together, the two
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documents present a fairly strong case that the Company was advocating extermination of
any Indians who refused to vacate the land around English settlements or plantations

The Second Anglo-Powhatan War
An incident that occurred in the spring of 1623 demonstrates how vindictive
Wyatt, formerly a leading proponent of English coexistence with the region’s Indians,
had become after the Uprising. Opechancanough had sent emissaries to Martin’s Hundred
to propose a truce that would allow both sides to plant crops, and to carry an offer to
return the surviving English prisoners taken the previous year. One of Opechancanough’s
emissaries was the same Chanco whom many historical narratives credit with saving
Jamestown from the ravages of the Uprising with his timely warning to Richard Pace.
The other, a weroance named Comahum, recognized as an active participant in the
surprise attacks of the Uprising, was put in chains and both messengers were escorted to
Jamestown. Wyatt received the embassy, and pretended acceptance of Opechancanough’s
terms. However, he plainly saw that by giving the Powhatans a chance to plant their corn,
he would know where and when to reap the Tsenacomoco harvest for Virginia’s
storehouses. In spite of Opechancanough’s promise to release the prisoners from Martin’s
Hundred before truce negotiations opened, only one woman, a Mrs. Boyse, was initially
released and escorted back to Jamestown. The difficulty in releasing the others seems to
have been largely a result of high-handed behavior on the part of English interpreter
Robert Poole, because Boyse carried a request that Wyatt recall him and send another
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interpreter with assurances that the truce was genuine. Poole’s unnamed replacement duly
arrived at Pamunkey with a stock of glass beads to pay for the release of the remaining
prisoners. Wyatt agreed to a meeting and dispatched Tucker, escorted by a dozen armed
militiamen, to negotiate on the colony’s behalf and bring the remaining English prisoners
home.91
Wyatt and the Council provided Tucker’s party with casks of wine, with which
they could invite their counterparts at Pamunkey to toast the success of the peace
negotiations. The wine meant for the Powhatans, however, was poisoned. Tucker and his
party made a great show of drinking first, filling their mugs with untainted wine from
another, hidden cask. An estimated 200 Indians succumbed to either the poison or the
musket balls that Tucker’s party fired into them. Opechancanough was said to have been
both poisoned and shot, and Tucker had apparently assured the Council that the warleader had died from one or the other “it beinge impossible for him to escape.”92
Opechancanough did not die, but his name does not appear in written records for
several years, strongly suggesting that either the poison or the shot-wounds had
incapacitated him during that time. The use of mass poisoning as a military tactic
suggests that Wyatt and the Council had taken the dehumanizing rhetoric of Waterhouse
and Brooke to heart. Tucker’s method was evocative of a modern homeowner setting out
poisoned bait to eliminate rats or cockroaches. Tucker’s tactic seems to have been more
than even the officers of the Virginia Company, who had called for a perpetual war
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against the Powhatans, could readily stomach. The Company’s August, 1623 letter to
Wyatt and the Council warmly approved their resolution to utterly drive away Virginia’s
treacherous enemies, but mildly rebuked their particular method, writing that they were
“to worthie to use any false dealings, and we desire that your proceedinge may be so faire
as may not only be free from the fault, but any just ground of suspicion.” The
admonishment was mild in comparison to the reprimand the Company issued in the
aftermath of the Uprising. Concern for its own public image, rather than horror at the
treacherous method by which English colonists had slaughtered their hosts at Pamunkey,
is most likely have been the Company’s motivation in issuing a reproach of any kind. The
mass poisoning incident was significant not only because of the number of Powhatans
who died, or merely because it deprived them of Opechancanough’s experience at
fighting the Tassantassas, but because Tucker’s party had an opportunity to scout the land
along the Pamunkey River and discover where the Powhatans were residing and growing
their corn. Because of this knowledge, English raids on the Powhatans in the next year
would cause more damage to their towns and pilfer more food than they had prior to the
aborted truce talks at Pamunkey.93
The English strategy for the first two years of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War
was largely one of separation from Native Americans, because the colonists lacked the
manpower to carry out an extermination program during that time. The outbreak of
hostilities and the new English policy of creating distance between themselves and Native
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American communities was probably beneficial for the Powhatans in one regard.
Extremely limited contact with the Tassantassas would have at least partially protected
the Powhatans from the epidemics that arrived in Virginia with new settlers and
decimated English settlements.94
On the English side lay two significant advantages: military technology and
replaceable personnel. Military technology was certainly a critical factor in the only
pitched battle of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War. In the fall of 1624, Wyatt personally
led a force of militia to Pamunkey, where he claimed to have defeated 800 bowmen under
Opitchapam in a two-day battle during which Wyatt reported that his troops had cut down
enough corn to feed 4,000 men for a year. Only a shortage of gunpowder prevented Wyatt
from launching more such attacks. Opitchapam appears to have had limited experience at
fighting the Tassantassas, because it is doubtful that Opechancanough would have faced
armored, musket-wielding Englishmen in a pitched battle.95
Opechancanough would certainly have been aware of how decisive European
firearms and cannons would be, having demonstrated reluctance to assault fortified
settlements in the teeth of English artillery. Just as certainly, the Powhatans would have
captured muskets and powder bags from many of their English victims in the Uprising.
Waterhouse provided an anecdote in which Opechancanough, having no idea of the
process of making gunpowder, assumed it came from a plant and had gunpowder sewn
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into the ground as if it were seed grain. In this instance, Waterhouse appears to have been
lampooning Opechancanough and his followers as absurd and untutored. Elsewhere in “A
Declaration of the State of Affaires in Virginia,” Waterhouse ridiculed Native
Americans as “so naked a cowardly a people,” who fled from their own women “as so
many Hares; much faster than from their tormenting Devill.” Having satirized his people
as timorous and henpecked, Waterhouse had no reason to refrain from drawing a verbal
caricature as Opechancanough himself as abysmally ignorant. His report, after all, not
only announced changing English policy, but was a major part of the Virginia Company’s
propaganda campaign.96
English Virginia’s crucial asset in the war with Powhatan-dominated
Tsenacomoco, ultimately, was what must have seemed to the Powhatans to be an
unlimited supply of replaceable personnel. One of the Virginia Company’s first responses
to Wyatt’s report of the Uprising was to recruit 400 settlers with a promise of many more.
During the remainder of 1622 and throughout 1623, the Company shipped hundreds of
settlers to a colony that lacked adequate food and shelter for them. The close quarters of
shipboard life facilitated the spread of disease during the voyage, and many
prospective settlers died at sea. Wyatt’s own wife, crossing from England in 1623,
appears to have escaped the unnamed epidemic that decimated the crew and passengers
of the ship on which she traveled, surviving to note with horror that she saw little else
during the voyage but the dead being thrown overboard. Others would die on arrival from
starvation, disease, and Powhatan hostility. But in the coming years, more ships from
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England arrived in Virginia, carrying more colonists. In spite of a death toll that prompted
James I to order an investigation of the Company’s management of Virginia late in 1623,
the colony’s population had increased slightly from 843 after the Uprising to 1,275 by the
beginning of 1624. In the following decade, that number nearly quadrupled to 4,914. In a
war of attrition such as the one into which Virginia’s colonists had settled against the
Powhatans, the English, who could absorb casualties and replace losses, held a significant
edge. That advantage would allow them to break out of the settlements and put their new
policy toward Native Americans into practice.97
The war degenerated into incessant reciprocal raids after Wyatt’s defeat of
Opitchapam at Pamunkey. The rout of 800 elite warriors who made up the backbone of
Powhatan fighting forces, the consequential loss of crucial food supplies just before
winter, and the infirmity of their greatest war-captain after the mass poisoning incident
seem to have demoralized the Powhatans, because by the winter of 1625, Wyatt reported
to the royal Commissioners for Virginia that Opitchapam had sued for peace. As he had
done in 1623, Wyatt planned to make a show of amenability to peace because the
Powhatans would then plant great quantities of corn in places known to the English. His
speculation that the supplies of ammunition and gunpowder the Commissioners had
promised would give the colony “fayre opportunity to revenge theire former Trecheries,”
if they arrived in Virginia in time show conclusively how little Wyatt was interested in
ending hostilities with the Powhatans.98
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Opechancanough appears to have remained infirm throughout 1628, because
Opitchapam continued to direct the Powhatan war effort. The Powhatans, who had shown
a propensity for killing the English men they had captured while adopting the women
captured at Martin’s Hundred, had spared the English male prisoners taken through the
course of 1628. Opitchapam allowed one of his English prisoners to send a message to
Jamestown. Opitchapam’s gesture of sparing and eventually repatriating male prisoners
appears to have sufficiently placated Acting Governor Francis West that he entered into
negotiations that led to another truce. The provisions of the proposed treaty appear to
have focused on continued separation between Virginia’s colonists and Tsenacomoco’s
Indians, with the Powhatans agreeing to stay out of English territory and refrain from
killing English livestock. West, however, was no more desirous of a lasting peace with
the Powhatans than Wyatt had been. Few English writers of the period appear to have
been able to refrain from applying the word “treacherous” in reference to Native
Americans or the word “treachery” to describe Native American actions. West was no
exception, and was quick to point out that he had agreed to a truce with the Powhatans in
the spring of 1628 “not to make any peace or dishonorable treaty with them,” but to lull
them into the same sense of complacency that Opechancanough had cultivated among the
colonists six years earlier.99
The truce seems to have lasted only a few months before West found an excuse to
break it. In January, 1629 he reported that the Powhatans “have been extremely false and
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altogether neglected the Condicons of the treaty and offered some Injuries in dyvers of
our plantacons.” After serious deliberation, the Governor and Council in Virginia
concluded that the colony’s safest course was to “utterly proclayme and maintayne
enmity and warres with all the Indians of these partes," in order to prevent a second
Uprising.100
For the next three years, the two sides settled into a familiar pattern of reciprocal
raiding. However, the English were able to bring its most important resource –
replaceable personnel – increasingly to bear. The Virginia colony continued to grow and
Tsenacomoco continued to shrink as more settlers poured into the region intent on
making their fortunes raising tobacco. English militia began raiding towns that had
previously been spared the devastation of years of warfare. A plan for settlers to occupy
the town that had been the seat of the Chiskiacks in the spring of 1629 shows English
awareness that Opechcancanough remained alive, and quite possibly more inimical than
ever after a six-year convalescence from English treachery at Pamunkey. An advantage
that newly-installed governor Sir John Harvey and the Council for Virginia saw in
settling the town was its proximity to important Powhatan towns on the Pamunkey, which
would enable the colonists to “face their greatest enemy Appechankeno and disable the
savages” the following spring.101
When the two sides eventually made peace in 1632, the treaty appears to have
been at least partly the result of food shortages on both sides. The Council for Virginia
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briefly noted that a drought that summer had caused a great scarcity of corn. By June, the
Chickahominies, undoubtedly feeling the effects of the drought, had broken ranks with
Opechancanough and sued for a separate peace with the Tassantassas. Three months
later, the Governor and Council reported that Virginia was at peace with the
Chickahominies and the Pamunkeys, but warned settlers against trusting them. Clearly,
the events of March 22, 1622 had been neither forgotten nor forgiven.102
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CHAPTER IV
THE FALL OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY
Perhaps the most significant English casualty of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War
was the Virginia Company of London, the joint-stock company in which both Edward
Waterhouse and Christopher Brooke had invested. It is probably not a coincidence that
two of the most strident English advocates of all-out war with the Powhatans had made
significant investments in the Virginia Company of London. Edward Waterhouse was not
only a Company employee, but he had purchased 25 pounds worth of Company stock: an
outlay equivalent to several thousand dollars in modern currency. Christopher Brooke’s
investment doubled Waterhouse’s. The loss of his investments are unlikely to have
bankrupted Waterhouse, the nephew and heir of a former Chancellor of the Exchequer of
Ireland. Nor would Brooke’s loss of 50 pounds have consigned the prosperous lawyer
and politician to a life of poverty. But it is easy to imagine Brooke grieving for his 50
pounds at the same time he lamented English casualties in his poem. It is similarly
sensible to postulate that Waterhouse’s vitriol against Native Americans was at least
partially a reaction to Opechancanough’s attacks on his personal interests.103
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When King James I granted The Virginia Company of London a charter in 1606
that assigned land rights in Virginia to colonists traveling there, he clearly intended to
monitor the project closely. The Council for Virginia, the colony’s governing body, was
to be comprised entirely of Company investors. However, the king reserved for himself
the right to select Council members from the Company’s ranks. Although the charter’s
sole stated purpose for establishing colonies in North America was the propagation of
Christianity among people who “as yet live in Darkness and miserable Ignorance of the
true Knowledge and Worship of God,” James I could not have been insensible of the
national importance of the Company’s endeavor. Trade with the far east had been an
objective for English merchants since the mid-sixteenth century, and several efforts had
already been made to find a passage to China around or through the North American
continent. Perhaps the key to a shorter route to the Orient than the Cape of Good Hope
that was popular with Portuguese and English traders lay somewhere in the waterways
that emptied into Chesapeake Bay. Additionally, Spanish colonization endeavors in the
Americas had resulted in the discovery and exploitation of precious metals that would
finance Spain’s emergence as an imperial power that at its height controlled territories in
Asia, the Americas, Europe and Africa. It would not have been difficult for the king to
speculate about the national wealth that a successful colonial venture could bring, or the
international prestige that new national wealth could convey. James I is likely to have
seen that by allowing Virginia adventurers some measure of self-government, he could
enjoy the benefits of a successful enterprise without incurring the inevitable expense of
maintaining a colony. On the other hand, he clearly recognized that the colony’s success
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was very much in his own interest, and could well have been arrogant enough to assume
that the Virginia project could succeed only under his close supervision.104
The second charter, which James I approved in 1609, granted the Virginia
Company more autonomy than the first, allowing its members to nominate, elect, and
replace its own officers. But the king still seemed eager to maintain his close scrutiny of
colonial affairs, requiring each new member of the Council in Virginia to “take his Oath
of a Counsellor to Us, our Heirs and Successors, for the said Company of Adventurers
and Colony in Virginia.” A third charter, granted to the Virginia Company in 1612,
confirmed the Company’s right to appoint a Council for Virginia from among its
membership to advise the king on colonial affairs. 105
Since its formation in 1606, the Virginia Company of London had been divided
into two factions: The Court Party and the Virginia Party. The Court Party, under the
leadership of Sir Thomas Smythe, who for 10 years served as Treasurer, the Company’s
presiding official, favored a heavy-handed approach to the colony’s governance.
Colonists, in the eyes of Smythe and the Court Party, were employees of the Virginia
Company of London, existed so that the Company could make a profit, and should have
no voice in the control of colonial affairs. Virginia Party leaders like the Earl of
Southampton, Sir Edwin Sandys, and Nicholas Ferrar, favored greater political
independence for settlers and believed that the Court Party’s restrictive policies had not
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only retarded English emigration to the New World, but had begun to drive many settlers
back to England. The appointment of Virginia Company Treasurer and Court Party leader
Sir Thomas Smythe’s kinsman, Samuel Argall, as Virginia’s governor in 1617 ultimately
led to the end of Court Party dominance within the Company, because Argall proved a
highly unpopular figure. Reports from Virginia filtered back to the Company that accused
Argall of seizing public warehouses, appropriating the tobacco and grain in them for his
own use, forcing indentured laborers to work for him rather than for the colony at large,
and holding laborers in bondage after their terms of indenture had expired. The Company
recalled Argall in 1618, and the next year, Sir Edwin Sandys replaced Smythe as
Treasurer, largely on the strength of reports on Argall’s misconduct. One of the
Company’s first moves under Virginia Party leadership was to accord Virginians the right
of local self-government through a General Assembly that convened at Jamestown in the
summer of 1619.106
The ascension of Sandys to the Virginia Company’s top executive position was
not calculated to please King James I. A notoriously autocratic ruler, James told
Parliament in 1610 that kings were God’s lieutenants on earth, and argued that “to
dispute what God may do is blasphemy … so is it sedition in subjects to dispute what a
king may do in the height of his powers.”107 It is not surprising that a monarch with such
an exalted sense of his own position preferred the close supervision of colonial affairs

W.R. Garrett, “The Father of Representative Government in America,” American Historical Magazine,
V. 1, No. 1 (January, 1896), 7; Julian Alvin Carroll Chandler, Makers of Virginia History, (New York,
Atlanta, Boston, Dallas, Chicago: Silver, Burdett and Company, 1904), 51; John Pory, "A Reporte of the
manner of proceeding in the general assembly Convented at James City, July 30, 31, August 2, 3, 4, 1619,”
in Kingsbury ed., The Records of the Virginia Company of London, V. 3, 153.
107
King James I, “Speech of James I before Parliament, 21 March, 1610, “in Select Statutes and Other
Constitutional Documents Illustrative of the Reigns of Elizabeth and James I, Third Edition, G.W. Prothero,
ed., (London, Edinburgh, New York and Toronto: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1906), 294.
106

78

that Court Party leaders advocated to the relative self-government that the Virginia Party
offered to settlers. Adding to the king’s displeasure with the Company was Sandys’
election as treasurer. Sandys, who had served for three decades in the House of
Commons, was an outspoken critic of James’ rule and a political ally of other members of
Parliament who opposed his high-handed approach to governing. James I clearly saw
Sandys as a political enemy, and when the Virginia Company was prepared to reelect him
as Treasurer in 1620, the king sent representatives to the meeting to command the
members to select someone else. According to some reports, James I attended the
meeting in person and shrieked at the Company’s investors to “Elect the devil, if you
will, but not Sir Edwin Sandys!” Sandys, hoping to preserve peace, withdrew his name as
a candidate for Treasurer, but with the election of the Earl of Southampton and the
appointment of Ferrar as deputy treasurer, the Virginia Party retained its control of the
Company. It was probably at this point that James I decided to revoke the Virginia
Company’s charter and was merely seeking an excuse to do so. The 1622 Uprising, and
the Company’s reaction to the crisis, provided him with the pretext he craved.108
James I seems to have had a particular stake in the economic diversification
project that the Virginia Company undertook when Sandys assumed leadership as
Treasurer in 1619. Thanks to John Rolfe’s efforts to cultivate a strain of West Indian
tobacco that was milder and more to European tastes than its harsh-tasting native
counterpart, Virginia had been exporting a cash crop since 1612. However, the colony’s
dependence on tobacco as an export crop would have incurred royal displeasure, because
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James I was vehement in his disdain for smoking. In his 1604 treatise “A Counterblaste
to Tobacco,” one of the first anti-tobacco publications in Western history, the king
expressed his scorn for smoking as a “vile, barbarous custome,” and Native Americans
who introduced the habit to Europeans as “beastly Indians, slaves to the Spaniards, refuse
to the world, and as yet aliens from the holy Covenant of God.” Why, he mockingly
demanded, should English smokers stop at adopting one Native American practice, when
they could further imitate Indians by dressing scantily, preferring trinkets like mirrors and
feathers to gold and jewels, and renouncing Christianity?109
Sandys is likely to have been aware of the king’s distaste for smoking, and could
well have felt considerable pressure to develop new commodities in Virginia that would
alleviate the colony’s dependence on tobacco as a cash crop. In a 1619 inventory of the
ships, colonists, and provisions sent to Virginia during the year, Sandys listed the
commodities that he hoped settlers would focus their energies on developing. He directed
150 new settlers who had been recruited specifically for the purpose to set up three iron
works, “proofe having been made of the extraordinary goodnesse of that Iron.” It is plain
that Sandys also saw Virginia as a treasure trove of raw materials for shipbuilding,
because he directed the Council in Virginia to oversee the production of cordage, tar,
pitch, and timber. Additionally, he thought Virginia’s climate would be suitable for the
cultivation of mulberry trees and vines, which would in time produce silk and wine,
which would make valuable trading commodities. The ambitious scope of Sandys’
economic diversification project shows the Virginia Company’s commitment to the
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success of its colonial venture and the confidence its shareholders felt that Virginia was a
potential treasure house. More to the point, by embarking on his program, Sandys was
staking the Company’s future that the Peace of Pocahontas, negotiated five years earlier,
would last. The incentive that Sandys offered to prospective settlers, however, would
have been sure to displease Opechancanough, which threatened the very peace upon
which his venture so heavily depended. New settlers were free to establish new
plantations on unoccupied land within five miles of the boroughs of James City, Charles
City, Henrico, and Kecoughtan; or within ten miles of any other plantation. Obviously,
Sandys either did not take into account or was indifferent to the fact that his land grant to
new colonists would threaten Powhatan resources.110
Considering the expenses of Sandys’ economic diversification project and the fact
that he had essentially gambled the Virginia Company’s future on its success, the
Company’s officers could not have seen Opechancanough’s attacks on English
settlements and plantations as anything other than catastrophic. In the destruction of
English vineyards and mulberry groves, many Company investors could have envisioned
the demolition of the prosperous future for themselves and Virginia on which Patrick
Copland had spoken with such buoyant anticipation in his Bow Church sermon.
However, the principle cause for the Privy Council investigation into the Company’s
management of the Virginia colony in 1623 appears to have been reports of prospective
settlers dying of starvation and disease during voyages to North America.
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The Virginia Company had focused much of its propaganda campaign in the
aftermath of Opechancanough’s attacks on recruiting new settlers to replace English
casualties from the Uprising. However, in its frantic haste to reinforce Virginia’s depleted
population, the Company appears to have been consistent in its failure to provide ships
carrying new colonists with enough food to last the voyage. A packet of letters arriving in
England on the Abigail, a ship returning from Virginia, brought alarming reports of the
scarcity and poor quality of the rations during the voyage to North America, and
widespread famine and disease in the colony. Richard Norwood, who sailed to Virginia as
a settler in early 1623, wrote in a letter to his father that the daily allowance during his
voyage for five men was one pound of bread and one quart of porridge. An especially
damning indictment of the Company’s failure to adequately provision ships bound for
Virginia came from Lady Wyatt’s letter to her sister, in which she described how she
arrived in Virginia sick and undernourished. It is not difficult to imagine the outrage that
Lady Wyatt’s sister must have felt at the Company, which had subjected its highborn
passenger to such privations. Nor is it unreasonable to suppose that she may have shown
the letter to an aristocratic, politically-connected acquaintance or two. Those
acquaintances, in their turn, might well have wondered at the competence of a company
that had allowed a governor’s wife to arrive in Virginia in such a woebegone state.111
Letters from the Abigail that described the state of the colony revealed that the
arrival of sick and half-starved new settlers, combined with the Company’s failure to
send additional food, served to exacerbate food shortages in the colony while adding
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shipboard epidemics to the list of Virginia’s travails. Newly-arrived settler Thomas
Nicholls, relating the daily misery of life in Virginia, noted that many colonists cursed the
Virginia Company for sending them to North America and for persuading them of the
plenty that awaited them, concluding that “For all this plenty the poore Tenants would
think themselves happy if they had but Butter & Cheese uppon Festivall dayes.” Virginia
colonist Samuel Sharp wrote that “The Lord’s hand hath ben more heavie by sicknes &
death then by the sword of our Enemyes.” Another settler, William Rowsley, summed up
the situation in Virginia after the 1622 assault by relating that the colony had “felt the
affliction of Warr, sense of sickness and death of a great number of men, likewise among
the Cattle for dogge have eaten in this winter more flesh than the men.” Several colonists,
ranging in rank from Lady Wyatt to indentured servant Thomas Best, included pleas for
food, particularly butter and cheese, in their letters to friends and relatives in England.112
The Abigail letters provided James I the pretext he needed to order an
investigation. London alderman Robert Johnson, a staunch Court Party partisan,
petitioned the king’s Privy Council for just such an investigation soon after the ship’s
arrival in April, 1623. A draft of his petition reveals the extent of Johnson’s political bias,
as he related that Virginia had flourished during the first 12 years of its existence, when
the Court Party dominated the Virginia Company. Since the Virginia Party gained control
of the Company, and with it management of the colony, corrupt and disorderly Company
investors who worked only for personal gain rather than the good of the colony were
allowing the plantation to go to ruin, Johnson lamented. In his eagerness to laud the Court
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Party’s management of the Virginia Company’s colonization project, Johnson was
decidedly disingenuous in neglecting to mention that the First Anglo-Powhatan War and
the Starving Time, times during which Virginia assuredly did not flourish, occurred on
the Court Party’s watch.113
Shortly after receiving Johnson’s petition, the royal Privy Council summoned the
leaders of the Virginia Company’s two factions. After a rancorous meeting with the
faction leaders, the Council ordered a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the Virginia
Company’s finances, conditions in the colony, and “all wronges and injuries done to any
of the Adventurers and Planters.” The speed with which the Privy Council acted strongly
suggests that its members had already decided to examine the Virginia Party’s
management of the Company and the colony. On May 9, the Privy Council appointed a
justice of the Court of Common Pleas, Sir William Jones, to head a seven-man task force
that would explore the Company’s past business transactions, what funds the Company
had received or collected, and how those funds had been spent. The Privy Council also
ordered the commission to scrutinize Virginia’s government for instances of malfeasance,
determine whether unnecessary hindrances to trade within the colony existed, and
ascertain the best means of alleviating partisan bickering between the Virginia Party and
the Court Party on both sides of the Atlantic. The commission would report directly to the
Privy Council, and had the authority to send for all documents relevant to the
investigation and to examine witnesses under oath.114
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Johnson’s petition to the Privy Council is likely to have been based on the king’s
known antipathy toward the Virginia Party in general and Sir Edwin Sandys in particular.
He could well have hoped that an investigation of the Virginia Party’s administration of
the Company and the colonial venture that had such national significance would lead to a
scandal that would allow his own Court Party to resume control of the Company. But
Sandys and other Virginia Party leaders gained a concession from the Privy Council that
the investigation would begin with Sir Thomas Smythe’s administration. This insistence
on an exploration of the Court Party’s management of the Virginia Company could easily
have been a vindictive effort on Sandys’ part to drag his rivals into disgrace with him.
Certainly, the Privy Council could not have failed to notice the discord between the
Virginia Company’s factions, and may have concluded that the constant in-fighting had
compromised the Company’s ability to focus on a venture that was far too important to
neglect.115
The Company’s two factions exchanged accusations and counter-accusations
throughout the Privy Council’s inquiry. The General Assembly of Virginia repudiated
Johnson’s claim that the colony had prospered under Sir Thomas Smythe’s tenure as
Treasurer of the Virginia Company, maintaining that Virginia had “remained in great
want and misery under most severe and Crewell laws.” Several investors, probably Court
Party stalwarts, submitted a brief complaint to the commission that accused Sandys of
seeking the Treasurer’s post to conceal his embezzlement of Virginia Company funds,
and of bringing the Company into debt “without any apparent meanes to discharge the
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same.” The investors also blamed Sandys for the faction-fighting within the Company,
not a completely inaccurate charge since Sandys, Southampton and Ferrar founded the
Virginia’s Company’s second faction. Johnson, whose petition to the Privy Council
launched the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry for Virginia, prepared a detailed
report on “Disorders in the Company and Colony” during the Virginia Party’s
administration. Foremost among the Company’s missteps in the wake of the 1622
Uprising, according to Johnson, was the transportation of new settlers to repopulate
Virginia without adequately supplying those settlers with food during their voyage from
England or ensuring sufficient housing for new arrivals in the colony. Short food
allowances and the overcrowding of ships bound for Virginia had led to shipboard
epidemics. Passengers arrived in the colony half-starved, and often died of diseases
contracted during the voyage from Europe; but not before infecting others. In less than
three years, Johnson wrote, approximately 3,000 colonists had died in Virginia, “for
which mortality noe other cause hath yet been shewed but the want of houses, pestring of
ships, shortness and badness of food.” 116
In his zeal to condemn the Virginia Party’s mismanagement of the Virginia
Company and its colonial venture, Johnson failed to include Powhatan hostility in his list
of contributing factors to the recent high death toll among Europeans in the New World.
However, the letters arriving on the Abigail gave Johnson powerful evidence to support
his claims of Virginia Party negligence. The aristocratic members of a king’s Privy
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Council and the Commission of Inquiry would have been particularly swayed by written
testimony from the aristocratic wife of a colonial governor, and would have been
especially appalled by her account of the conditions under which she traveled to Virginia.
The Commission, having taken charge of the Virginia Company’s records, soon
discovered that the Company was bankrupt. Correspondence from Virginia painted a
bleak picture of the colony’s future. And hearings before the Commission of Inquiry
demonstrated to the commissioners and the Privy Council that factional strife had
hopelessly divided the Virginia Company’s house against itself. In the fall of 1623, the
Privy Council proposed a new charter for the Company that would place the colony’s
governing body under the more immediate supervision of the king. According to the
terms of the proposed new charter, the king would appoint a governor and 12 assistants,
who would manage the Virginia Company and the colony.117
When the Privy Council announced the king’s intention to remodel the Company
and Virginia’s government, the Virginia Company replied that the surrender of its
existing charter was a matter of such consequence that its members needed a month to
consider the proposal and discuss it at the quarterly meeting in mid-November. The Privy
Council’s demand for the Company’s reply to the king’s proposal within the week
prompted an emergency investors’ meeting on October 20, 1623, during which only nine
members of the 70 who were present voted to surrender the charter. At the regular
quarterly meeting on November 19, only seven investors voted in favor of relinquishing
the Company’s charter. By this time, the Court of King’s Bench had initiated quo
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warranto proceedings against the Virginia Company. The case was called up during the
Trinity Term of the King’s Bench in the spring of 1624, with the king’s attorney general
Sir Thomas Coventry arguing for the revocation of the Virginia Company’s charter on
the grounds that it set too few limits on the Company’s power in the colony. Somewhat
strangely, Coventry’s principle concern appears to have been the Virginia Company’s
power to transport as many Englishmen to Virginia as wished to travel there. Where
Donne had proclaimed that Virginia’s function as a depository for England’s surplus
population alone justified its continued existence in his sermon at St. Paul’s cathedral two
years earlier, Coventry worried that the Company “may in the end carry away all the
King’s subjects into a foreign land.”118
On June 16, 1624, Chief Justice Sir Francis Ley ruled “That the Patent or Charter
of the Company of English Merchants trading to Virginia, and pretending to exercise a
power and authority over his Majestys good subjects there, should be thenceforth null and
void." Ten days later, the Privy Council ordered Ferrar to deliver “all the Patentes,
bookes of account, together with the invoises concerning the late Corporation of
Virginia” to the keeper of the Council chest. And James I ushered in Virginia’s new era
as a royal colony on July 15 when he issued a proclamation appointing 13 commissioners
residing in the colony and 13 more living in England to take charge of affairs in Virginia.
The king confirmed the national importance of England’s colonial ventures in North
America, and declared that the Virginia Company’s mismanagement was to blame for the
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precarious state of that venture. The Company’s program of hastily transporting new
settlers to the colony with inadequate supplies in response to the Uprising certainly
contributed to the disease and famine that ravaged the colony throughout 1622 and 1623.
Moreover, the Company had disappointed the king in his high hopes that Virginia “would
pduce many staple and good comodities.” Much of the responsibility for Virginia’s
failure to live up to the king’s economic expectations must fall on Opechancanough’s
violent disruption of Sandys’ economic diversification program in the colony just as it
was getting properly underway, but James I laid the culpability squarely on the
Company’s doorstep. Government of the colony through a locally-elected General
Assembly, James believed, was inherently inefficient because it placed Virginia’s affairs
in too many hands and had caused “much contencon and confusion.” A body of
counselors, nominated by himself, had governed the colony in Virginia’s first 12 years, in
accordance with “our most prudente and princely instruccons given in the beginyng of
the plantacon.” That form of government, the king declared, had been more effective than
the more democratic form of government that the Virginia Party had set up during its
control of the Virginia Company, and Virginia as a royal colony would return to that
system forthwith. Among the councilors appointed were Sir Thomas Smythe, the recently
knighted Sir Samuel Argall, and Alderman Johnson; all former Virginia Company
investors who had been prominent members of the Court Party. Sandys, Nicholas Ferrar,
and Southampton were not nominated. The Virginia Company’s demise meant the end of
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the Virginia Party, while the king integrated Court Party leaders into new management
positions.119
King James I had always recognized the importance for England of entering the
competition against other European powers, and had always intended to monitor the
Virginia Company’s activities closely. But he seems to have been patient with the
Company’s failure to turn Virginia into a profitable venture, so long as the Company’s
leadership remained compliant to royal suggestions. It was only when the Virginia Party,
led by some of the king’s more prominent political detractors, came to dominate the
Virginia Company that James I began to entertain the idea of revoking the Company’s
charter. The 1622 Uprising, and the Virginia Company’s disastrous response to the
attacks, essentially handed James I the justification he sought to end his political rivals’
influence over colonial affairs. But if Opechancanough and the Powhatans could claim a
victory over the Virginia Company, they would not succeed in their probable objective to
contain the Tassantassas. The Virginia colony may have been under new management
after 1624, but the colonists’ newly-adopted, two pronged policy of separation from or
extermination of Native Americans remained unchanged.
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CHAPTER V
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES
Beyond Virginia
On May 26, 1637, a force of about 160 attackers descended on a fortified
settlement on the Mystic River in the newly established English colony of Connecticut.
As hundreds of allied troops surrounded the settlement, the main attack force smashed its
way through the town’s two gates. Defenders inside the fort, disoriented by the surprise
attack, barricaded themselves inside their homes or attempted to flee. Those who took
refuge in their homes died when attackers burst into one dwelling after another. Those
who fled died when their attackers cornered them inside the fort and hacked them to
pieces, or rounded them up and summarily butchered them in the swamp outside the
walls. The two leaders of the attack set fires at each end of the settlement, which quickly
spread until they had consumed the entire compound.120
Like Opechancanough’s attacks on English settlements in Virginia 15 years
earlier, the assault on the Mystic River fort was the result of tensions between English
settlers and Native Americans over land usage. Like the Powhatans, the attackers at
Mystic River spared neither age nor sex, dragging women and children from their hiding
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places under beds to slaughter them. An important difference between the two events is
that the defenders at Mystic River were not English colonists, but Pequot Indians. The
assault force consisted of 90 Connecticut militiamen under Captain John Mason and 70
Massachusetts troops under Captain John Underhill. Their allies, stationed in the swamp
around the fort to intercept escaping Pequot survivors, consisted of about 200
Narragansetts and Mohegans: Native American groups who were traditional rivals of the
Pequots.121
The Mystic Massacre demonstrated that the two-pronged English policy of
extermination of and separation from Native Americans, adopted in Virginia in the wake
of the 1622 Uprising, had spread to New England. Extermination efforts at Mystic were
so successful, Underhill reported in his account of the attack, that out of 400 Pequots
inside the town, “not above five of them escaped out of our hands.” Underhill appears to
have been aware that some readers of his account would be horrified by the slaughter of
women and children, insisting that Christians should have more mercy and compassion.
But at times, he wrote, “Scripture declareth women and children must perish with their
parents.” Mason’s account of the attack included similarly pious sentiments, but was far
more jubilant in tone than Underhill’s. “It was the Lord's Doings,” Mason exulted, “and it
is marvellous in our Eyes! It is He that hath made his Work wonderful, and therefore
ought to be remembred.” Connecticut colonist Philip Vincent specifically cited the 1622
Uprising in Virginia as a justification for the eradication of an entire Pequot village. The
killing of Indians, Vincent declared, preserved peace in New England “better than our
English Virginians were by being killed by them.” Both Vincent and Underhill echoed
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Edward Waterhouse in labeling Native Americans as treacherous and perfidious, and
Underhill expanded on this theme by writing that “long forbearance and too much lenity
of the English towards the Virginian salvages, had like to have been the destruction of the
whole plantation” because Indians would always “abuse the goodness of those that
condescend to their rudeness and imperfections.”122
As had been the case in Virginia after the 1622 Uprising, English colonists in
New England concluded that Native Americans were not trustworthy neighbors, and must
therefore be either driven westward to make way for European settlement further inland
or eradicated entirely. In New England’s campaign against the Pequots, colonists affected
separation from Native Americans by selling hundreds of prisoners into slavery in the
West Indies. Combined with the killing of about 1,500 Pequots by New England
colonists and Indian allies in the region, the campaign had reduced the Pequots in number
to between 180 and 200. Those survivors, Mason gleefully wrote, offered themselves as
vassals to the English in exchange for a bare assurance of their lives. The Narragansets,
who had acted as allies to the English throughout the Pequot War, expressed admiration
at the efficacy of European weapons, but also expressed alarm at the ruthless nature of
European war-making, protesting that “it is too furious and slays too many men.” The
Narragansets’ alarm proved well-founded some 40 years later when the English colonists
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of Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Connecticut turned the weapons at which they had
marveled against them during Metacom’s Rebellion.123
An intriguing development after the Pequot War resulted from English fear of
perceived Indian treachery. William Bradford, the second governor of Plymouth Colony,
wrote that rumors of a general Native American conspiracy against English settlers
resulted in an accord between the governments of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
Plymouth to form into an entity known as the United Colonies of New England. The
Narragansetts, allies of the English during the Pequot War and accessories to the Mystic
Massacre, appear to have become disenchanted with their European neighbors, because
Bradford claimed that Narragansett plotting was at the heart of the purported Indian
conspiracy against New England.124
Shortly after the participating colonial governments signed the Articles of
Confederation of the United Colonies of New England, the Narragansett sachem, or chief
Minatonomi led a force of between 900 and 1,000 warriors against the less powerful
Mohegans, giving the newly-unified New England colonies an occasion to field-test their
new alliance. Faced with a choice between their main Native Americans allies in the
Pequot War, New England policymakers chose to intervene on behalf of the weaker
Mohegans, which undoubtedly alienated the Narragansetts 125
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The pattern of English encroachment on Native American land and armed Indian
resistance to that incursion, established in Virginia and repeated in Connecticut, spread to
New England on a large scale in the 1670s. Settlers in New England had not forgotten the
1622 Uprising in Virginia, and the fear of similar uprisings seems to have occupied a
prominent niche of their collective mentality. When a Christianized Wampanoag Indian
named John Sausaman was killed in Plymouth Colony in late 1674, Puritan minister and
author Cotton Mather opined that the three Wampanoags accused of his murder had acted
primarily because Sausaman had approached Plymouth’s governor, Josiah Winslow, with
a report that the Wampanoags and several other Native American groups were plotting
coordinated attacks on English settlements, similar to Opechancanough’s attacks in
Virginia.126
The apprehension, trail, and execution of Sausaman’s alleged murderers was a
challenge to the authority of Metacom, the Wampanoag sachem; the more so because one
of his senior councilors, a man known to New England colonists as Tobias, had been
among the accused. Not only was the trial of Wampanoags in an English court an affront
to Metacom’s prerogatives as sachem, it was a miscarriage even of English justice
because English law of the late seventeenth century required the testimony of two
witnesses to obtain a conviction for murder, and the prosecution could only produce a
single Indian who claimed to have been an eyewitness to Sausaman’s death. A jury of
12 English settlers and six Christianized “Praying Indians” unanimously sentenced
Tobias and his associates to death by hanging, which sentence was carried out on Tobias
and his friend June 8, 1674. Tobias’ son, the last of the accused to ascend the gallows,
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was spared his father’s fate when the rope broke. Given a chance to save his life, Tobias’
son confessed that he had been an onlooker while his father and their friend murdered
Sausamon. By coercion, the prosecution had obtained the requisite number of witnesses.
Having escaped hanging, Tobias’ son was held prisoner in Plymouth for a month before
being taken out of the jail and shot.127
Metacom must indeed have been preparing for war against his English neighbors
even before Sausaman’s murder, because his response to the English affront to his
sovereignty was too prompt and too well-organized to have been an impulsive act. Within
days of the trial and executions at Plymouth, Wampanoags and their Narrangansett allies
raided English settlements near Mount Hope, “the seat where Philip was kennell’d with
the rest of these horrid salvages.” 128 The Narrangansetts, who had assisted in the
extermination of the Pequots as a nation 40 years before, had clearly become thoroughly
disenchanted with their former English allies. In the war that followed, both the
Wampanoags and the Narrangansetts would suffer essentially the same fate as the
Pequots before them. By the end of King Philip’s War in 1676, between 2,000 and 3,000
Wampanoags and Narragansetts had been killed or captured, and no more than 100
Narragansetts remained alive and at liberty. The Narragansetts, having allied with
Connecticut settlers against the Pequots, had seen for themselves the English game of
divide-and-conquer, then had seen the European invaders capitalize on divisions between
Native American groups. Ultimately, they felt the full force of the “furious” European
style of warfare, and many of those who were not exterminated ended their lives as slaves
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in the West Indies, where it is possible they met Pequots whom they had helped enslave
under similar circumstances some 40 years earlier.
The presence of Christianized Nipmuck Indians in New England demonstrates
that some of the region’s Puritan settlers had initially attempted to live alongside and
assimilate the Native Americans they encountered. Indeed, the incident that sparked King
Philip’s War was the murder of John Sausaman, whom Mather described as “a godly
Indian,” who “was wont to curb those Indians that knew not God on the account of their
debaucheries.” Although Mather wrote of the murdered Sausaman with the reverence
accorded a Christian martyr, New England’s colonists had little regard and less trust for
living Christianized Indians. Complaints of the perceived treachery of Christian Indians
like that of Massachusetts Bay colonist Mary Pray to a local militia officer that they
“commonly give the Indians noatis (notice) how to escape the English,” and that “they
are as bad as any other (Indians),” led the Massachusetts Bay General Court of Election
to brusquely order about 500 Praying Indians transported to Deer Island in Boston Harbor
in October, 1675.129
In November, 1675, the members of the Court made it abundantly clear that they
expected treachery from the Praying Indians still living in or near English settlements
when they ordered them transported to islands in the region and mandated that “none of
the said Indians shall presume to goe off the sajd islands voluntarily, upon pajne of death;
and it shall be laufull for the English to destroy those that they shall finde stragling off
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from the sajd places of theire confinement, unlesse taken of by order from authority, and
under an English guard.” Almost as an afterthought, the General Court instructed ordered
a country treasurer to ensure that the Indians interned on Deer Island were adequately
provisioned and sheltered. But after a visit to Deer Island, the Puritan minister John Eliot,
whose missionary work had converted many of them to Christianity, reported that there
was neither food, firewood, nor building materials for shelter to be found there, and the
interned Indians were freezing in threadbare clothing. By the time the General Court
ordered detained Praying Indians returned “to their oune plantations, or such lands of the
English as may be procured for them,” in May, 1676, about half of the Native Americans
who had wintered on Deer Island had died of starvation or exposure.130
Through forced relocation, the Massachusetts General Court temporarily affected
physical separation from Native American groups who had attempted to adopt, if not
English culture, then at least English religious practices. The General Court of Elections
of Plymouth Colony advocated separation through enslavement of captured Native
Americans, and this sentence applied not only to prisoners who had proven to be active
combatants against the English during King Philip’s War, but also to Indians who had
failed to warn colonial governments of Metacom’s plans to attack English settlements.
The Massachusetts Bay General Court favored extermination of Native Americans who
fell into English hands, ruling in September, 1676 that “such of them as shall appeare to
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have imbrued their hands in English blood should suffer death here, and not be
transported into forreigne parts.”131
Edward Waterhouse’s recommendations in the diatribe he wrote in the aftermath
of Opechancanough’s surprise attacks in Virginia had included separation from and
dispossession, enslavement, and extermination of Native Americans. It certainly would
have gratified him to see so many of his proposals put into practice 50 years after the
1622 Uprising and hundreds of miles from Virginia.
An Epilogue in Virginia
Opechancanough lived well into his 90s, and appears to have behaved peaceably
enough after the Second Anglo-Powhatan War to once again lull his English neighbors
into complacency; an impressive accomplishment given the catastrophic impact that the
1622 Uprising had on both the Virginia colony and the Virginia Company. Because of
the scarcity of documents from the period, Opechancanough’s behavior toward the
English between 1632 and 1644 is a matter of speculation. But it is difficult to believe
that any posture other than that of abject submission to all English demands would have
duped Virginia’s government into the belief that Opechancanough was no longer a
danger to the colony. His appearance of physical decrepitude seems could easily have
helped him maintain an appearance of harmlessness. By 1644, he could no longer walk,
and had to be carried on a litter. His eyelids had become so heavy that he could not see,
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unless they were raised by his attendants. But he had retained his mental acuity, his
organizational ability, and especially his resentment of the Tassantassas. 132
When Opechancanough coordinated the assaults against Virginia settlements in
1644 that triggered the third Anglo-Powhatan War, it is possible that he had heard rumors
of the outbreak of civil war in England, and had decided to take advantage of political
disarray across the Atlantic in the belief that King Charles I would be too concerned with
his own precarious position on the throne to send reinforcements or supplies to the
colony. But although keeping abreast of developments in the enemy camp would have
been consistent with Opechancanough’s standing as a career war-leader, he did not have
to look across the ocean to find internal discord amongst the Tassantassas. Sir John
Harvey, who had been appointed governor of Virginia in 1628, had proven to be wildly
unpopular with the colonists for his unjust and arbitrary rule, and with the Council in
Virginia for his haughty treatment of its members. In 1635, the Council sent Harvey back
to England, accompanied by two of its members, Captain Samuel Mathews and Francis
Potts to testify to his misconduct. The king, however, ruled that the Council’s accusations
were, if not groundless, at least exaggerated. Harvey was restored as governor and
returned to Virginia in January, 1637, while Mathews and Potts remained in England
under arrest. Harvey quickly made himself even more unpopular than during his first
term, ordering the arrest of five Council members on the grounds that they had usurped
royal authority in removing him from office. Charles I and the Privy Council responded

John Ferrar, A Perfect Description of Virginia, Being, a Full and True Relation of the Present State of
the Plantation, Their Health, Peace and Plenty, (London: Printed for Richard Wodenoth at the Star under
Peter’s Church in Cornhill, 1649), 11; Rountree, Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough, 183; Beverley,
The History of Virginia, V.1, 49.
132

100

to complaints from colonists and petitions from Mathews and Potts by officially
removing Harvey from office, and commissioning Sir Francis Wyatt to return to Virginia
for another term as governor. It is possible that Opechancanough hoped to take advantage
of political squabbling and its accompanying confusion in the colony, but if so, he waited
too long to make his move. By the time he launched his surprise attacks, Sir William
Berkeley, Wyatt’s replacement, had been in office for two years, and at least some
semblance of political stability had returned to the colony in the five years since the end
of Harvey’s tenure. It is more probable that Opechancanough was aware that his death
was approaching, and wanted to make one last gesture of defiance to his longtime
English enemies.133
Whatever his motivation may have been, Opechancanough’s attacks in the spring
of 1644 on settlements along the York River and on the south side of the James surprised
the Tassantassas as much as his 1622 assaults had. The Powhatans killed some 500
settlers, slaughtered their cattle, and destroyed their crops in the coordinated assault. The
1644 attacks, however, had less of an impact than the 1622 Uprising, partly because there
was less interaction between Virginia’s colonists and the Powhatans, and partly because
Virginia’s European population exceeded 8,000 colonists by this time. However, his
second series of surprise attacks probably served to reinforce the notion of Native
American treachery to settlers throughout North America’s English colonies.134
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After the initial surprise attacks, Opechancanough’s forces withdrew into the
forests and swamps, not even attempting to harass settlers with sniping attacks as they
had done after the 1622 Uprising. The Wayanocks and those Nansemonds who had
followed Opechancanough fled their homelands along the James River entirely, and
never returned. Berkeley, for his part, acted quickly and decisively, designating militia
general William Claiborne to immediately take the offensive against the remnants of the
Powhatan confederacy. Claiborne accordingly sent forces up the York to storm
Opechancanough’s capital at Pamunkey, destroying crops, killing all the fleeing Indians
they could catch, and forcing the survivors further inland. Other military expeditions in
the summer of 1644 targeted Indian villages along the James and the Chickahominies.
Opechancanough himself remained at large until the spring of 1646, when Berkeley,
having received word of the mamanatowick’s whereabouts from an unnamed source,
personally led a party of cavalry that ran down a party of Pamunkeys as they were trying
to carry him to safety.135
Opechancanough was brought back to Jamestown as a prisoner. Berkeley had
thoughts of enhancing his reputation in England by presenting Charles I with a royal
captive. In the meantime, Berkeley appears to have made a public spectacle of his
prisoner, displaying him to the colonists in exactly the same way that a modern
zookeeper would display a dangerous animal that had been hunted down, captured, and
caged. Fiercely protective of his dignity to the end, Opechancanough, hearing the sounds
of footsteps and animated conversation around him, asked a jailer to lift up his eyelids so
he could see the source of the tumult. On discovering that a crowd of colonists had been
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let into the jail to gawk at him, he truculently sent for Berkeley and scornfully told him
that, had their situations been reversed, he would not have so callously exposed him as a
show for his people.136
Berkeley’s plan to send his prisoner to England came to naught when, two weeks
after Opechancanough’s capture, one of the soldiers assigned to guard the old
mamanatowick fatally shot him in the back in a fit of pique. Given that Opechancanough
could neither walk nor see, it would have been impossible for Berkeley to pass off the
murder as a failed escape attempt, but there is no record of the soldier being disciplined
in any way for his action. The Pamunkey weroance Necotowance succeeded
Opechancanough and agreed to a peace treaty with Virginia that bound all the tribes
formerly of the Powhatan confederacy to leave the land between the James and York
Rivers for English habitation, while the land north of the York River was reserved for
Native American habitation and hunting grounds.137
The treaty ending the Third Anglo-Powhatan War was in keeping with the
English policy of affecting separation from their Native American neighbors. But as the
white population in North America increased, the settlers pushed their Native American
neighbors further into the continent’s interior. By 1685, only 2,900 Indians remained in
Virginia east of the Blue Ridge Mountains, compared to over 14,000 in 1607, when the
first English settlers arrived. 138
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Conclusion
The slaughter of a significant portion of the Virginia colony’s population and the
failure of the Virginia Company of London are likely to have been events of immediate
consequence in the 1620s. But an overpopulated England was able and willing to replace
the colonists killed in the 1622 Uprising, and the dissolution of a joint stock company
plainly did not deter the English crown’s commitment to make a success of a colonization
effort in North America after three failures.
The shift in English attitudes toward Native Americans and the major
modification of English policy regarding Native Americans were the most momentous
and far-reaching consequences of the 1622 Uprising. When the first English colonists
sailed into the Chesapeake Bay and up the James River, they had specific instructions
from the Virginia Company not to trust the region’s Native Americans, but also to avoid
offending them if possible. When the colonists were unable or unwilling to avoid
antagonizing the powerful Indian confederacy they encountered, Virginia narrowly
avoided becoming England’s fourth failed colonial venture in North America. But
between the end of First Anglo-Powhatan War and the 1622 Uprising English policy
makers on both sides of the Atlantic favored a program of peaceful and cooperative
contact between settlers and Native Americans, although the relationship was always to
be that of superior and subordinate, with the Anglocentric colonists occupying the
superior role. The establishment of Henricus College in 1619 was perhaps the most
visible symbol of the cooperation between English settlers and the Powhatans during the
Peace of Pocahontas. The Virginia Company of London initially founded the college to
evangelize Native Americans and train them to work in trades that would benefit the
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colony. By 1621, however, the Company had considered having the sons of white
planters educated at Henricus alongside Native American students as an alternative to
sending them to schools in England.139
The destruction of the College of Henricus during the Uprising was likely to have
been a symbolic gesture of Opechancanough’s rejection of English institutions, as well as
a rejection of English efforts to incorporate Native Americans into the Virginia colony.
Given that his coordinated attacks were mostly on Virginia’s outlying settlements and
plantations, and Powhatan tactics against English colonists were limited to hit-and-run
raids, it seems likely that Opechancanough’s intent was to curtail English encroachment
on Native American croplands and hunting grounds. Certainly, the Uprising represented
the destruction of English hopes to assimilate Native Americans into Virginia’s social
order. Following the Second Anglo-Powhatan War, all English hopes of an interracial
society in Virginia vanished. Mistrust of Native Americans dominated Anglo-American
thinking after 1622, and that suspicion inspired a program of almost total separation from
and incessant enmity toward Indians. Colonial officials tolerated the presence in their
settlements of Native Americans who had converted to Christianity or displayed
complete subservience to Anglo-American culture. But as the internment of Praying
Indians on Deer Island during King Philip’s War proved, English colonists were skeptical
of even the most cooperative Native Americans.140
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American historian J. Frederick Fauzs referred to the 1622 Massacre as the first
terrorist attack in Anglo-America, noting that terrorism may not have entered the English
language until the end of the eighteenth century, but the concept of calculated violence
against citizens of an enemy power with the intent of making noncombatants experience
the suffering that their society had inflicted on others was far from unknown to
seventeenth century Europeans. The 1605 Gunpowder Plot, in which a group of English
Catholics attempted to assassinate King James I by blowing up the House of Lords while
Parliament was in session, has recently received recognition as England's first modern
terrorist conspiracy.141 Opechancanough’s attacks on English settlements in Virginia
qualify as an act of terrorism not only because they were planned assaults on
noncombatants, but because they created the same sense of devastation and fury that
survivors of modern terrorist attacks often experience.
As is often the case in the aftermath of modern terrorist raids, a call for revenge
accompanied the anger that English policymakers felt in the wake of the 1622 Uprising.
In response to Wyatt’s news of the attacks, the Virginia Company’s Treasurer and
Council for Virginia excoriated the Powhatans as “ungratefull to all benefit, and
uncapable of all goodness.” and ordered Sir Francis Wyatt to pursue all possible means to
exact such a “sharp revenge uppon the bloody miscreants,” as to erase them from the face
of the earth, or at least expel them from Virginia. Clearly, the seventeenth century notion
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of English justice demanded that the Powhatans be punished as severely as modern state
actors demand that the sponsors of present-day terrorist incidents be chastised.142
In the late sixteenth century, Richard Hakluyt had held up agents of Spanish
colonization in the New World as examples of how Europeans should not behave toward
Native Americans. Indian victims of Spanish atrocity were “lambes,” torn apart by
Spaniards who fell upon them “as wolves, as lyons, and as tygers moste cruell.” After the
1622 Uprising, Native Americans had themselves become, in Christopher Brooke’s
estimation, “wolves,” “tygars,” and “no better than a heard of beasts.” Where Hakluyt
had abhorred Spanish cruelty, Waterhouse admired Spanish persistence in establishing
and securing New World possessions in spite of the “calamities and mischiefs” that
Indians visited upon them.143
Edward Waterhouse, an otherwise obscure figure who disappears from historical
records after writing “A Declaration of the State of the Colony and Affaires in Virginia,”
had a major impact on the shaping of Anglo-American doctrine regarding Native
Americans. Indians would be steadily dispossessed throughout the next 150 years so that
“their cleared grounds in all their villages which are situate in the fruitfullest places of the
land shall be inhabited by us.”144 Throughout the English colonies, white settlers and
Indians withdrew to separate locales, and as colonial populations expanded, white
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encroachment would steadily dispossess Native Americans of more of their hunting
grounds and croplands until the Royal Proclamation of 1763 created a boundary line
between the British colonies and Native American lands at the Appalachian Mountains,
forbidding colonial governments to grant warrants of survey or land patents in land
reserved for Indian hunting and habitation. And after the Revolutionary War ended the
British colonial presence in what is now known as the United States rendered the
Proclamation of 1763 null and void, the boundaries between white settlement and Native
American homelands were pushed relentlessly further west. The process that ended with
Indians being forced onto reservations as the United States expanded to the Pacific Ocean
began on the morning of March 22, 1622.
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